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alaskahoffman/portaltext

https://github.com/alaskahoffman/portaltext · scanned 2026-06-17 01:31 UTC (1 month, 2 weeks ago)

30 raw signals (0 security + 30 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 month, 2 weeks ago · v2 · last Δ +20.7 (diff) · 30 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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77.8% cov · 30 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

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Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 14 Low 11 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 30 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 5 Security 8 Quality 17

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 97.4/100 with 77.8% coverage. It contains 383 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 30 findings — concentrated in quality (17), security (8), frontend (5). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 14 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 25 of 30 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — extension/background.js:427

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — extension/portaltext.js:6

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — server.js:384

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in server.js:3446

Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.

server.js:3446 Cors wildcard

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in extension/popup.js:161

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

extension/popup.js:161 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in extension/portaltext.js:1451

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

extension/portaltext.js:1451 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in index.html:4500

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

index.html:4500 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in portaltext.js:529

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

portaltext.js:529 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in supporter-thanks.html:86

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

supporter-thanks.html:86 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'domparser_html_parse' in extension/portaltext.js:1562

Found a known-risky pattern (domparser_html_parse). Review and replace if possible.

extension/portaltext.js:1562 Domparser html parse

medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected

The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.

auth

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Runtime service client appears to use placeholder configuration

A runtime source file appears to wire Supabase/Firebase/AI/payment-style clients to placeholder URLs, keys, or fallback values. In the Fable corpus this often means the UI/API shape is present while the backend service is not actually configured.

Runtime configService clientGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio

0 test file(s) for 7 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.

Coverage

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 14 env vars used in code but missing from .env.example

Drift between code and config docs. The first few: `ALLOWED_ORIGINS`, `AUTH_DB_PATH`, `OPENROUTER_INPUT_PRICE`, `OPENROUTER_OUTPUT_PRICE`, `OPENROUTER_SEARCH_MODEL`, `STRIPE_PAYMENT_LINK`, `STRIPE_SECRET_KEY`, `STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET` + 6 more. Add them (with a placeholder/comment) to .env.example s…

config drift

low System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap

Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: ci, tests. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 51 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Old/deprecated-named symbol `rest_v1` in server.js:403

Names with suffixes like `_old`, `_v1`, `_deprecated` usually indicate replaced-but-not-removed code (typical AI-coder leftover). Confirm and delete, or rename if it's the active version.

old markerDead code

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — extension/background.js:59