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RBOKproject/univers-yhb-apercu

https://github.com/RBOKproject/univers-yhb-apercu · scanned 2026-06-15 23:47 UTC (2 months, 3 weeks ago)

34 raw signals (0 security + 34 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 3 weeks ago · v1 · 34 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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Combined
80.2
/100
Security checks
80
0 findings
System graph
80
66.7% cov · 34 findings
Critical
0
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 23 Low 4 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 34 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 1 Security 15 Cicd 1 Quality 17
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 80.2/100 with 66.7% coverage. It contains 237 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 34 findings — concentrated in quality (17), security (15), frontend (1). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 23 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 27 of 34 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — yh-brands/design-canvas.jsx:128
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — yh-brands/image-slot.js:62
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license, ci, tests. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap
Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, ci, tests. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in index.html:1418
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
index.html:1418 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in LUniversYHB-v11-interactive.html:965
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
LUniversYHB-v11-interactive.html:965 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in LUniversYHB-v11-portable.html:970
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
LUniversYHB-v11-portable.html:970 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in LUniversYHB-v11-wordpress.html:920
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
LUniversYHB-v11-wordpress.html:920 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in LUniversYHB-v13-interactive.html:1413
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
LUniversYHB-v13-interactive.html:1413 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in LUniversYHB-v13-portable.html:1418
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
LUniversYHB-v13-portable.html:1418 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in LUniversYHB-v13-wordpress.html:1361
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
LUniversYHB-v13-wordpress.html:1361 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in univers.html:1413
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
univers.html:1413 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in yh-brands/image-slot.js:235
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
yh-brands/image-slot.js:235 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'insert_adjacent_html' in index.html:1419
Found a known-risky pattern (insert_adjacent_html). Review and replace if possible.
index.html:1419 Insert adjacent html
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'insert_adjacent_html' in LUniversYHB-v13-interactive.html:1414
Found a known-risky pattern (insert_adjacent_html). Review and replace if possible.
LUniversYHB-v13-interactive.html:1414 Insert adjacent html
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'insert_adjacent_html' in LUniversYHB-v13-portable.html:1419
Found a known-risky pattern (insert_adjacent_html). Review and replace if possible.
LUniversYHB-v13-portable.html:1419 Insert adjacent html
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'insert_adjacent_html' in LUniversYHB-v13-wordpress.html:1362
Found a known-risky pattern (insert_adjacent_html). Review and replace if possible.
LUniversYHB-v13-wordpress.html:1362 Insert adjacent html
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'insert_adjacent_html' in univers.html:1414
Found a known-risky pattern (insert_adjacent_html). Review and replace if possible.
univers.html:1414 Insert adjacent html
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — scripts/build_portable.py:65
`urllib.request.urlopen(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.
auth
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected
No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.
CI/CD securityCoverage
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
0 test file(s) for 21 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
Coverage
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 12 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Multiple root agent instruction files without precedence
The repo has multiple top-level AI-coder instruction files. Without precedence rules, different agents may follow different policies.
Governance
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
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