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trevarj/guix-toys

https://github.com/trevarj/guix-toys · scanned 2026-06-16 00:41 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

22 raw signals (0 security + 22 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 16 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 6 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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77.8% cov · 16 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 10 Low 2 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 16 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 1 Security 3 Cicd 4 Quality 8

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 74.8/100 with 77.8% coverage. It contains 75 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 22 findings — concentrated in cicd (10), quality (8), security (3). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 10 medium. Recommended next step: open the cicd layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 12 of 16 actionable findings. 22 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — site/js/db.js:6

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing tests. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 CI is configured but no tests are detected

A CI pipeline exists, but the scan found no test files to gate. Opus labeled this generated-code pattern as config theater: release machinery exists, but it has little behavioral signal.

CI/CDConfig theaterRepo hardening

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

PromyLOPh/[email protected] can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

.github/workflows/build-deploy.yml:56 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/build-deploy.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/deploy-site.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in site/js/app.js:93

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

site/js/app.js:93 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'insert_adjacent_html' in site/js/app.js:101

Found a known-risky pattern (insert_adjacent_html). Review and replace if possible.

site/js/app.js:101 Insert adjacent html

medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected

The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.

auth

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio

0 test file(s) for 6 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.

Coverage

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 7 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/checkout@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

2 files, 7 locations

.github/workflows/build-deploy.yml:36, 61, 225, 241 (4 hits)

.github/workflows/deploy-site.yml:30, 49, 55 (3 hits)

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

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