llvm/llvm-project

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52 of your 80 findings came from Repobility's proprietary detections. ✓ Repobility tags below mark them.

https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project · scanned 2026-06-05 20:25 UTC (4 days, 12 hours ago) · 10 languages

78 findings 11/13 scanners ran 90th percentile · C · large (100-500K LoC)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

28 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 25 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

Score breakdown â 2026-05-18-v5

Component	Sub-score	Weight	Contribution
`structure_score`	60.0	0.15	9.00
`security_score`	100.0	0.25	25.00
`testing_score`	85.0	0.20	17.00
`documentation_score`	81.0	0.15	12.15
`practices_score`	72.0	0.15	10.80
`code_quality`	64.0	0.10	6.40
Overall		1.00	80.4

security_score may be inflated — optional security scanners were skipped on this fast scan

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 7 Medium 4 Low 6 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 28 System graph 0 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 15 Cicd 7 Security 1 Software 5

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

Showing 16 of 28 actionable findings. 53 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

low Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.35 ✓ Repobility 4 occurrences Workflow references repository secrets in a pull_request workflow

Fork pull_request runs do not receive normal repository secrets on GitHub Actions. Review this as a reliability/intent signal, not as direct fork-secret exfiltration. Raise severity only for pull_request_target or another trusted-context path that runs untrusted PR code with secrets.

2 files, 4 locations

.github/workflows/release-asset-audit.yml:67, 68 (2 hits)

.github/workflows/release-binaries-all.yml:118, 119 (2 hits)

CI/CD securityworkflow secretsGitHub Actions

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED034] Python Subprocess Shell True: subprocess(..., shell=True) enables command injection.

Review and fix per the pattern semantics. See CWE-78 / for context.

.github/workflows/ci-post-commit-analyzer-run.py:16

high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility 5 occurrences [MINED118] Dockerfile FROM `ci-container-build-tools (no tag)` not pinned by digest: `FROM ci-container-build-tools (no tag)` resolves the tag at build time. The registry CAN re-push a different image for the same tag, so every build is potentially different. Production images should pin to `image@sha256:...` for reproducibility + supply-chain integrity.

Replace with: `FROM ci-container-build-tools (no tag)@sha256:<digest>`. Get the digest from `docker manifest inspect`. Re-pin via a scheduled bot (Renovate, Dependabot).

4 files, 5 locations

.github/workflows/containers/github-action-ci-tooling/Dockerfile:86, 102 (2 hits)

.github/workflows/containers/github-action-ci-windows/Dockerfile:3

.github/workflows/containers/github-action-ci/Dockerfile:1

.github/workflows/containers/libc/Dockerfile:1

high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED119] Dockerfile `ADD https://aka.ms/vs/17/release/vs_buildtools.exe`: Dockerfile `ADD <url>` downloads a remote artifact into the image with no integrity check. If the host or DNS is compromised between layers — or if the URL serves a different file later — malicious content gets baked into the image.

Download the file in CI with a known checksum, vendor it into the repo, and COPY it during the build. Or use `RUN curl -sSL URL | sha256sum -c <(echo '<expected> -')` to verify.

.github/workflows/containers/github-action-ci-windows/Dockerfile:9

high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED126] Workflow container/services image `ghcr.io/llvm/ci-ubuntu-24.04-format` unpinned: `container/services image: ghcr.io/llvm/ci-ubuntu-24.04-format` without `@sha256:...` pulls a mutable tag at workflow-run time. Treat workflow container references with the same supply-chain discipline as Dockerfile FROM lines.

Replace with `ghcr.io/llvm/ci-ubuntu-24.04-format@sha256:<digest>`. Re-pin via Dependabot Docker scope.

.github/workflows/pr-code-format.yml:16

medium Security checks quality Practices conf 1.00 [CFG006] Missing .gitignore: No .gitignore file. Risk of committing secrets and build artifacts.

Add a .gitignore appropriate for your language/framework.

medium Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility 3 occurrences [MINED109] Mutable default argument in `run_ninja` (list): `def run_ninja(... = []/{}/set())` — Python's default value is constructed ONCE at function definition time and shared across all calls. Mutating it in one call mutates it for every future call too.

Use None as the default and create the collection inside the function: `def run_ninja(x=None): x = x or []`

2 files, 3 locations

.ci/buildbot/worker.py:243, 338 (2 hits)

.ci/generate_test_report_lib.py:176

low Security checks security Injection conf 0.50 [SEC005] Command Injection Risk: Unsafe shell execution or eval of user input.

Use subprocess with shell=False and a list of args. Never eval user input.

.github/workflows/ci-post-commit-analyzer-run.py:16

low Security checks quality Error handling conf 0.55 ✓ Repobility 5 occurrences Broad exception handler needs review

This handler catches Exception/BaseException. It is actionable when it swallows errors without logging, re-raising, or returning a structured error. Handlers that intentionally convert exceptions into typed error results should not be treated as high risk.

lines 93, 161, 164, 167, 208

.ci/buildbot/worker.py:93, 161, 164, 167, 208 (5 hits)

Error handlingquality

medium Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.90 Docker build context has no .dockerignore

Add .dockerignore with at least .git, .env, private keys, dependency folders, build outputs, and local databases.

.dockerignore CI/CD securitycontainers

high Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.82 3 occurrences Docker final stage has no non-root USER

Add a non-root USER in the final runtime stage after files and permissions are prepared.

3 files, 3 locations

.github/workflows/containers/github-action-ci-tooling/Dockerfile:104

.github/workflows/containers/github-action-ci-windows/Dockerfile:3

.github/workflows/containers/github-action-ci/Dockerfile:101

CI/CD securitycontainers

medium Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.84 Dockerfile ADD downloads remote content

Use curl/wget with a pinned URL, verify checksum or signature, and prefer COPY for local files.

.github/workflows/containers/github-action-ci-windows/Dockerfile:9 CI/CD securitycontainers

low Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.72 7 occurrences Dockerfile installs recommended OS packages

Add `--no-install-recommends` and explicitly list only packages the image needs.

3 files, 7 locations

.github/workflows/containers/github-action-ci-tooling/Dockerfile:9, 29, 61, 106 (4 hits)

.github/workflows/containers/github-action-ci/Dockerfile:7, 49 (2 hits)

.github/workflows/containers/libc/Dockerfile:4

CI/CD securitycontainers

high Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.72 3 occurrences Dockerfile keeps pip download cache

Use `pip install --no-cache-dir ...` in container builds.

2 files, 3 locations

.github/workflows/containers/github-action-ci-tooling/Dockerfile:82, 98 (2 hits)

.github/workflows/containers/github-action-ci-windows/Dockerfile:52

CI/CD securitycontainers

low Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.74 Dockerfile leaves apt package indexes in the image layer

End the apt install layer with `rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*`.

.github/workflows/containers/github-action-ci-tooling/Dockerfile:9 CI/CD securitycontainers

low Security checks quality Quality conf 0.60 Duplicated implementation block across source files

Duplicate implementation blocks are maintenance debt. Keep them visible, but they are not a high-severity defect unless the duplicated logic is security-sensitive or drifting.

bolt/lib/Rewrite/GNUPropertyRewriter.cpp:19 duplicationquality

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