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ahmed-komiha/coach-app

https://github.com/ahmed-komiha/coach-app · scanned 2026-06-17 01:29 UTC (1 month, 2 weeks ago)

29 raw signals (0 security + 29 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 month, 2 weeks ago · v2 · last Δ -14.9 (diff) · 29 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
61.8
/100
Security checks
62
0 findings
System graph
62
100.0% cov · 29 findings
Critical
0
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 20 Low 6 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 29 Crowd 0 Layer: Api 1 Hardware 6 Security 8 Cicd 2 Quality 12
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 61.8/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 530 nodes across 17 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 29 findings — concentrated in quality (12), security (8), hardware (6). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 20 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 26 of 29 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — frontend/src/api/chat.ts:17
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — frontend/src/api/client.ts:14
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — public/service-worker.js:41
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/launch.json
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/launch.json VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: backend/Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: frontend/Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/deploy.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/components/charge-modal.js:48
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/components/charge-modal.js:48 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/components/day-tabs.js:7
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/components/day-tabs.js:7 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/components/header.js:29
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/components/header.js:29 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/components/nav-bar.js:7
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/components/nav-bar.js:7 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/views/dashboard.js:95
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/views/dashboard.js:95 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/views/nutrition.js:163
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/views/nutrition.js:163 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/views/training.js:62
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/views/training.js:62 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'local_storage_auth_token' in frontend/src/stores/authStore.ts:24
Found a known-risky pattern (local_storage_auth_token). Review and replace if possible.
frontend/src/stores/authStore.ts:24 Local storage auth token
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected
Found 20 placeholder/mock markers across 8 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.
Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Runtime service client appears to use placeholder configuration
A runtime source file appears to wire Supabase/Firebase/AI/payment-style clients to placeholder URLs, keys, or fallback values. In the Fable corpus this often means the UI/API shape is present while the backend service is not actually configured.
Runtime configService clientGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
1 test file(s) for 57 source file(s) (ratio 0.02). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
Coverage
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: eclipse-temurin:25-jre
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
backend/Dockerfile:10 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: maven:3.9-eclipse-temurin-25
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
backend/Dockerfile:2 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: nginx:1.27-alpine
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
frontend/Dockerfile:10 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: node:22-alpine
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
frontend/Dockerfile:2 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/deploy-pages@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/deploy.yml:40 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
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