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susumutomita/TenkaCloudChallenge

https://github.com/susumutomita/TenkaCloudChallenge · scanned 2026-06-16 00:26 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

52 raw signals (0 security + 52 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 47 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 5 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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Combined
41.1
/100
Security checks
41
0 findings
System graph
41
100.0% cov · 47 findings
Critical
2
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 2 High 4 Medium 15 Low 24 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 47 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 6 Network 3 Hardware 5 Security 10 Quality 10 Api 13
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 41.1/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 286 nodes across 14 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 52 findings — concentrated in api (13), hardware (10), security (10). Risk profile is high: 2 critical, 4 high, 15 medium. Recommended next step: open the api layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 45 of 47 actionable findings. 52 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in battles/security-battle-royale/api/api.py
Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.
battles/security-battle-royale/api/api.py:215
critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in scripts/kumo-evaluate-problems.ts
Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.
scripts/kumo-evaluate-problems.ts:34
high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .claude/skills/new-problem/SKILL.md
Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.
.claude/skills/new-problem/SKILL.md:134 SecretsClaude instruction
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 Flask mutation route `api_auth` without `@login_required` — battles/security-battle-royale/api/api.py:199
Flask route declares POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH methods without an auth decorator. Add `@login_required` (Flask-Login) or equivalent.
battles/security-battle-royale/api/api.py:199 securityAuth flask unauth route
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 Flask mutation route `api_db_status` without `@login_required` — battles/security-battle-royale/api/api.py:109
Flask route declares POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH methods without an auth decorator. Add `@login_required` (Flask-Login) or equivalent.
battles/security-battle-royale/api/api.py:109 securityAuth flask unauth route
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 Flask mutation route `set_db_password` without `@login_required` — battles/security-battle-royale/api/api.py:125
Flask route declares POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH methods without an auth decorator. Add `@login_required` (Flask-Login) or equivalent.
battles/security-battle-royale/api/api.py:125 securityAuth flask unauth route
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/new-problem/README.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/new-problem/README.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing tests. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 CI is configured but no tests are detected
A CI pipeline exists, but the scan found no test files to gate. Opus labeled this generated-code pattern as config theater: release machinery exists, but it has little behavioral signal.
CI/CDConfig theaterRepo hardening
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: battles/microservice-migration-battle/services/catalog/Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: battles/microservice-migration-battle/services/orders/Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: battles/microservice-migration-battle/services/users/Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/kumo-evaluate-problems.ts:11
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
scripts/kumo-evaluate-problems.ts:11 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'subprocess_shell_true' in battles/security-battle-royale/api/api.py:261
Found a known-risky pattern (subprocess_shell_true). Review and replace if possible.
battles/security-battle-royale/api/api.py:261 Subprocess shell true
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — battles/security-battle-royale/api/api.py:261
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.
auth
medium System graph network Security conf 1.00 Privileged port 10 in use
Port 10 is privileged (<1024). Make sure the service runs with the right caps or front it with a non-privileged port via a load balancer.
battles/stackstack/template.yaml Ports
medium System graph network Security conf 1.00 Privileged port 5 in use
Port 5 is privileged (<1024). Make sure the service runs with the right caps or front it with a non-privileged port via a load balancer.
battles/stackstack/template.yaml Ports
medium System graph network Security conf 1.00 Privileged port 9 in use
Port 9 is privileged (<1024). Make sure the service runs with the right caps or front it with a non-privileged port via a load balancer.
battles/stackstack/template.yaml Ports
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
0 test file(s) for 11 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
Coverage
low System graph hardware Coverage conf 1.00 Containers defined but no K8s/orchestration manifest found
Repo has Dockerfiles/compose but no Kubernetes/Nomad manifests. If the target deployment is K8s, the manifests may live in a separate ops repo.
Deployment
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 14 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 6 occurrences Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: node:20-alpine
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
3 files, 6 locations
battles/microservice-migration-battle/services/catalog/Dockerfile:3, 8 (2 hits)
battles/microservice-migration-battle/services/orders/Dockerfile:3, 8 (2 hits)
battles/microservice-migration-battle/services/users/Dockerfile:9, 15 (2 hits)
containersPinned dependencies
low System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'debug_true' in battles/security-battle-royale/api/api.py:266
Found a known-risky pattern (debug_true). Review and replace if possible.
battles/security-battle-royale/api/api.py:266 Debug true
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — battles/microservice-migration-battle/services/catalog/src/index.ts:50
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — battles/microservice-migration-battle/services/orders/src/index.ts:50
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — battles/microservice-migration-battle/services/users/src/index.ts:70
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — scripts/build-index.ts:94
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — scripts/kumo-evaluate-problems.ts:65
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — scripts/validate-problems.ts:448
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: ANY /
`battles/security-battle-royale/api/api.py` declares `ANY /` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: ANY /api/v1/apistatus
`battles/security-battle-royale/api/api.py` declares `ANY /api/v1/apistatus` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: ANY /api/v1/auth
`battles/security-battle-royale/api/api.py` declares `ANY /api/v1/auth` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: ANY /api/v1/dbstatus
`battles/security-battle-royale/api/api.py` declares `ANY /api/v1/dbstatus` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: ANY /api/v1/dragons
`battles/security-battle-royale/api/api.py` declares `ANY /api/v1/dragons` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: ANY /api/v1/latest
`battles/security-battle-royale/api/api.py` declares `ANY /api/v1/latest` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: ANY /api/v1/proxy
`battles/security-battle-royale/api/api.py` declares `ANY /api/v1/proxy` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: ANY /api/v1/region
`battles/security-battle-royale/api/api.py` declares `ANY /api/v1/region` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: ANY /api/v1/setdbpwd
`battles/security-battle-royale/api/api.py` declares `ANY /api/v1/setdbpwd` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: ANY /backdoor
`battles/security-battle-royale/api/api.py` declares `ANY /backdoor` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: ANY /index.html
`battles/security-battle-royale/api/api.py` declares `ANY /index.html` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /meta
`battles/microservice-migration-battle/services/users/src/index.ts` declares `GET /meta` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who co…
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /score
`battles/microservice-migration-battle/services/users/src/index.ts` declares `GET /score` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who c…
Unused endpoint
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