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claude-code-templates

https://github.com/davila7/claude-code-templates.git · scanned 2026-05-17 03:09 UTC (13 hours, 12 minutes ago) · 10 languages

903 findings (15 legacy + 888 scanner) 8/10 scanners ran 68th percentile · Python · small (2-20K LoC) Scanner says 50 (higher by 28)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 13 hours, 12 minutes ago · v2 · 459 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
Combined
64.4
/100
Repobility
79
15 legacy
9-layer
50
100.0% cov · 444 gaps
Critical
10
click to filter
Agents
6
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: source: legacy × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 10 High 49 Medium 101 Low 268 Source: Legacy 15 9-layer 444 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 144 Security 37 Software 77 Frontend 93 Network 10 Hardware 1 Cicd 20 Api 77
Scan summary Repository scanned at 49.5/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 13159 nodes across 30 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 444 findings — concentrated in quality (134), frontend (93), api (77). Risk profile is high: 10 critical, 44 high, 98 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 15 of 459 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
cli-tool/components/hooks/automation/telegram-pr-webhook.py:83 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
cli-tool/.claude/sandbox/cloudflare/src/index.ts:34 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
.claude/hooks/telegram-pr-webhook.py:83 ssrflegacy
medium Legacy security auth conf 0.92 [AUC001] No Repobility access matrix policy found: The repository uses web/API frameworks but does not define .repobility/access.yml or equivalent authorization documentation.
Add .repobility/access.yml mapping routes to anonymous, authenticated, owner, admin, and super_admin. Keep business-specific rules in the repo so CI can enforce them.
authlegacy
medium Legacy quality practices conf 1.00 [CFG006] Missing .gitignore: No .gitignore file. Risk of committing secrets and build artifacts.
Add a .gitignore appropriate for your language/framework.
practiceslegacy
high Legacy quality error_handling conf 1.00 [ERR001] Silent Exception Swallowing: Silently swallowing all exceptions hides bugs. Even in cleanup code, log at DEBUG level.
Log the error: `except Exception: logger.debug('cleanup failed', exc_info=True)`. Or handle specific exception types.
cli-tool/components/hooks/monitoring/context-timeline.py:171 error_handlinglegacy
high Legacy quality error_handling conf 1.00 [ERR001] Silent Exception Swallowing: Silently swallowing all exceptions hides bugs. Even in cleanup code, log at DEBUG level.
Log the error: `except Exception: logger.debug('cleanup failed', exc_info=True)`. Or handle specific exception types.
cli-tool/components/agents/obsidian-ops-team/Scripts/daily_notes_connector.py:264 error_handlinglegacy
medium Legacy quality quality conf 0.78 Public web service has no security.txt
Add /.well-known/security.txt with Contact, Expires, Canonical, Preferred-Languages, and Policy fields. Keep the contact endpoint monitored.
.well-known/security.txt qualitylegacy
low Legacy security auth conf 0.76 [AUC005] No authorization-focused tests detected: No test files with common authorization, ownership, 403, admin, or super_admin assertions were found.
Add regression tests for anonymous denial, cross-user object denial, admin role limits, and super_admin-only behavior.
authlegacy
low Legacy quality quality conf 0.86 Duplicated implementation block across source files
Extract the shared behavior into one function/module or delete the inactive duplicate after proving which path is used.
cli-tool/components/settings/statusline/deadline-countdown.py:13 qualitylegacy
low Legacy quality quality conf 0.86 Duplicated implementation block across source files
Extract the shared behavior into one function/module or delete the inactive duplicate after proving which path is used.
cli-tool/components/hooks/automation/telegram-pr-webhook.py:1 qualitylegacy
low Legacy quality quality conf 0.86 Duplicated implementation block across source files
Extract the shared behavior into one function/module or delete the inactive duplicate after proving which path is used.
cli-tool/components/agents/obsidian-ops-team/Scripts/tag_standardizer.py:116 qualitylegacy
low Legacy quality quality conf 0.86 Duplicated implementation block across source files
Extract the shared behavior into one function/module or delete the inactive duplicate after proving which path is used.
api/track-download-supabase.js:33 qualitylegacy
low Legacy quality quality conf 0.86 Duplicated implementation block across source files
Extract the shared behavior into one function/module or delete the inactive duplicate after proving which path is used.
api/claude-code-monitor/parser.js:1 qualitylegacy
low Legacy quality quality conf 0.86 Duplicated implementation block across source files
Extract the shared behavior into one function/module or delete the inactive duplicate after proving which path is used.
api/claude-code-monitor/check-version.js:4 qualitylegacy
{# ── 2026-05-17 Round 14: AI-agent bridge footer ────────────────────── Discoverability: the /agents/voting/ guide + MCP manifest exist but aren't linked from anywhere users actually land. Small, opt-in footer. #}
For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.
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