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sebzmunoz/hecho-trading-app

https://github.com/sebzmunoz/hecho-trading-app · scanned 2026-06-16 00:06 UTC (2 months, 3 weeks ago)

25 raw signals (0 security + 25 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 3 weeks ago · v1 · 21 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 4 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
58.6
/100
Security checks
59
0 findings
System graph
59
55.6% cov · 21 findings
Critical
0
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 12 Low 4 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 21 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 1 Security 7 Cicd 2 Quality 11
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 58.6/100 with 55.6% coverage. It contains 203 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 25 findings — concentrated in quality (11), security (7), cicd (6). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 12 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 16 of 21 actionable findings. 25 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 CI is configured but no tests are detected
A CI pipeline exists, but the scan found no test files to gate. Opus labeled this generated-code pattern as config theater: release machinery exists, but it has little behavioral signal.
CI/CDConfig theaterRepo hardening
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/deploy.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in landing/index.html:530
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
landing/index.html:530 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in reference/design-brief.html:1823
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
reference/design-brief.html:1823 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in reference/design-system.html:2717
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
reference/design-system.html:2717 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/app.js:66
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/app.js:66 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/components.js:76
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/components.js:76 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/panel.js:47
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/panel.js:47 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'insert_adjacent_html' in src/app.js:94
Found a known-risky pattern (insert_adjacent_html). Review and replace if possible.
src/app.js:94 Insert adjacent html
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected
Found 29 placeholder/mock markers across 9 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.
Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
0 test file(s) for 19 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
Coverage
low System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap
Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, tests. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 5 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/checkout@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
lines 28, 33, 46, 48, 53
.github/workflows/deploy.yml:28, 33, 46, 48, 53 (5 hits)
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
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