steveantini/legalos — Repobility public scan

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steveantini/legalos

https://github.com/steveantini/legalos · scanned 2026-06-16 00:22 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

100 raw signals (0 security + 100 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 100 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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Security checks

77.8% cov · 100 findings

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Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 6 Medium 14 Low 11 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 100 Crowd 0 Layer: Api 1 Frontend 21 Security 7 Cicd 1 Quality 70

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 64.1/100 with 77.8% coverage. It contains 2314 nodes across 1 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 100 findings — concentrated in quality (70), frontend (21), security (7). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 6 high, 14 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 31 of 100 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .claude/skills/api-security.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

.claude/skills/api-security.md:33 SecretsClaude instruction

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .claude/skills/database-security.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

.claude/skills/database-security.md:224 SecretsClaude instruction

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .claude/skills/environment-management.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

.claude/skills/environment-management.md:63 SecretsClaude instruction

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .claude/skills/infra-security.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

.claude/skills/infra-security.md:33 SecretsClaude instruction

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .claude/skills/nextjs.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

.claude/skills/nextjs.md:355 SecretsClaude instruction

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .claude/skills/supabase.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

.claude/skills/supabase.md:123 SecretsClaude instruction

medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — docs/design/aperture/atrium-aperture-tweakable.jsx:58

Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html

Fq dangerous html

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — docs/design/aperture/design-canvas.jsx:63

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — lib/connections/attachment-content.ts:24

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — lib/connections/providers/c4l-connector-drift.ts:19

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — lib/connections/providers/google-drive.ts:112

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — lib/content/c4l-fetch.ts:146

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/database-patterns.md

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

.claude/skills/database-patterns.md VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/frontend-security.md

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

.claude/skills/frontend-security.md VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license, ci. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in docs/design/aperture/atrium-aperture-tweakable.jsx:58

Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.

docs/design/aperture/atrium-aperture-tweakable.jsx:58 Dangerous innerhtml

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected

No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.

CI/CD securityCoverage

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 88 placeholder/mock markers across 50 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Runtime service client appears to use placeholder configuration

A runtime source file appears to wire Supabase/Firebase/AI/payment-style clients to placeholder URLs, keys, or fallback values. In the Fable corpus this often means the UI/API shape is present while the backend service is not actually configured.

Runtime configService clientGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap

Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, ci. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 30 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Icon-only button without accessible name — docs/design/aperture/chat-aperture.jsx:657

A `<button>` whose only child is a single glyph or symbol needs `title=` or `aria-label=` so screen readers (and tooltips on hover) work. Why: P3 in CHECKLIST.md — icon-only buttons skipped a title. Rule id: fq.button.no-label

Fq button no label

low System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Low test-to-source ratio

46 tests / 397 src (ratio 0.12).

low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected

No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — scripts/import-c4l-plugin.ts:313

Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak

Fq console leak

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — scripts/mint-demo-token.ts:126

Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak

Fq console leak

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — scripts/reset-demo-org.ts:200

Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak

Fq console leak

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — scripts/seed-workflow-templates.ts:189

Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak

Fq console leak

low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: lib/marketing/documentation.tsx (1293 lines)

Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.

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