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suuuucdcz/poly

https://github.com/suuuucdcz/poly · scanned 2026-06-16 00:26 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

32 raw signals (0 security + 32 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 32 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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Combined
83.2
/100
Security checks
83
0 findings
System graph
83
100.0% cov · 32 findings
Critical
0
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 9 Medium 8 Low 13 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 32 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 2 Hardware 3 Frontend 1 Security 9 Cicd 1 Quality 12 Api 4
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 83.2/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 217 nodes across 16 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 32 findings — concentrated in quality (12), security (9), api (4). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 9 high, 8 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 30 of 32 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Blocking `urllib.request.urlopen(...)` inside `async def _get` — backend/weather_feed.py:77
Sync I/O inside an async function blocks the event loop. While `urllib.request.urlopen(...)` is running, *all* other coroutines on this loop are paused — silent throughput collapse under concurrency. Use the async equivalent (`httpx.AsyncClient`, `asyncio.sleep`, `aiofiles`) or wrap with `await asy…
backend/weather_feed.py:77 Sync io in asyncPerformance
high System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Blocking `urllib.request.urlopen(...)` inside `async def fetch_api_json` — backend/polymarket_client.py:36
Sync I/O inside an async function blocks the event loop. While `urllib.request.urlopen(...)` is running, *all* other coroutines on this loop are paused — silent throughput collapse under concurrency. Use the async equivalent (`httpx.AsyncClient`, `asyncio.sleep`, `aiofiles`) or wrap with `await asy…
backend/polymarket_client.py:36 Sync io in asyncPerformance
high System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Blocking `urllib.request.urlopen(...)` inside `async def metno_daily_max_by_date` — backend/weather_feed.py:222
Sync I/O inside an async function blocks the event loop. While `urllib.request.urlopen(...)` is running, *all* other coroutines on this loop are paused — silent throughput collapse under concurrency. Use the async equivalent (`httpx.AsyncClient`, `asyncio.sleep`, `aiofiles`) or wrap with `await asy…
backend/weather_feed.py:222 Sync io in asyncPerformance
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `configure_bot` without auth dependency — backend/main.py:180
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
backend/main.py:180 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `purge_old_positions` without auth dependency — backend/main.py:135
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
backend/main.py:135 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `reset_portfolio` without auth dependency — backend/main.py:121
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
backend/main.py:121 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `sell_position` without auth dependency — backend/main.py:146
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
backend/main.py:146 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `start_bot` without auth dependency — backend/main.py:168
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
backend/main.py:168 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `stop_bot` without auth dependency — backend/main.py:174
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
backend/main.py:174 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — frontend/sw.js:32
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap
Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, ci, tests, operator-readme. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in backend/main.py:42
Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.
backend/main.py:42 Cors wildcard
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in frontend/app.js:201
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
frontend/app.js:201 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.
auth
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected
No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.
CI/CD securityCoverage
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
0 test file(s) for 20 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
Coverage
low System graph hardware Coverage conf 1.00 Containers defined but no K8s/orchestration manifest found
Repo has Dockerfiles/compose but no Kubernetes/Nomad manifests. If the target deployment is K8s, the manifests may live in a separate ops repo.
Deployment
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 11 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: python:3.12-slim
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
Dockerfile:2 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Near-duplicate function bodies in 2 places
Functions with the same first-5-line body hash: backend/db.py:get_positions, backend/db.py:get_position This is *the* AI-coder failure mode (4× more duplication in vibe-coded repos — see https://jw.hn/ai-code-hygiene). Consolidate or document why they're separate.
duplicatesduplication
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Docs conf 1.00 No README detected
No README file was found. Generated repos without README context are hard to operate, validate, or safely hand off.
ReadmeRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: fetch_event
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
backend/polymarket_client.py:44
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: open_browser
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
run.py:8
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /
`backend/main.py` declares `GET /` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /manifest.webmanifest
`backend/main.py` declares `GET /manifest.webmanifest` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /sw.js
`backend/main.py` declares `GET /sw.js` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /api/positions/purge-old
`backend/main.py` declares `POST /api/positions/purge-old` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
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