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sinakult/sea-chest2

https://github.com/sinakult/sea-chest2 · scanned 2026-06-16 00:13 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

178 raw signals (0 security + 178 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 175 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 3 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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66.7% cov · 175 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 3 High 1 Medium 15 Low 99 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 175 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 92 Security 7 Cicd 2 Quality 74

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 63.5/100 with 66.7% coverage. It contains 711 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 178 findings — concentrated in frontend (92), quality (76), security (7). Risk profile is high: 3 critical, 1 high, 16 medium. Recommended next step: open the frontend layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 118 of 175 actionable findings. 178 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in tool/batch_generate.js

Detected pattern matching generic_api_key. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.

tool/batch_generate.js:46

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in tool/regenerate_infant_math_quests.js

Detected pattern matching generic_api_key. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.

tool/regenerate_infant_math_quests.js:27

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in tool/seed_demo_accounts.js

Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.

tool/seed_demo_accounts.js:29

high System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Runtime dotenv file present in repo: functions/.env

`functions/.env` looks like a runtime dotenv file. No high-confidence secret value was matched, but runtime dotenv files often drift into live credentials. Move real values to a secret manager and keep only `.env.example` style templates in source control.

functions/.env ConfigEnv fileRuntime env

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — functions/index.js:1493

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — tool/batch_generate.js:136

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — tool/build_worldcup_assets.js:109

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — tool/ls_list_ids.js:20

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — tool/regenerate_infant_math_quests.js:53

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — tool/scan_paper_questions.js:56

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — tool/scan_paper_questions_batch.js:171

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 2 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

FirebaseExtended/action-hosting-deploy@v0 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

lines 73, 96

.github/workflows/ci.yml:73, 96 (2 hits)

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in tool/build_facebook_assets.js:16

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

tool/build_facebook_assets.js:16 Node child process

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in tool/build_worldcup_assets.js:18

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

tool/build_worldcup_assets.js:18 Node child process

medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected

The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.

auth

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 26 placeholder/mock markers across 7 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Runtime service client appears to use placeholder configuration

A runtime source file appears to wire Supabase/Firebase/AI/payment-style clients to placeholder URLs, keys, or fallback values. In the Fable corpus this often means the UI/API shape is present while the backend service is not actually configured.

Runtime configService clientGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio

9 test file(s) for 107 source file(s) (ratio 0.08). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.

Coverage

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 638 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/upload-artifact@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

.github/workflows/ci.yml:27 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 3 occurrences Near-duplicate function bodies in 2 places

Functions with the same first-5-line body hash: tool/build_paper_catalog.py:render_pages, tool/build_reference_catalog.py:render_pages This is *the* AI-coder failure mode (4× more duplication in vibe-coded repos — see https://jw.hn/ai-code-hygiene). Consolidate or document why they're separate.

3 occurrences

repo-level (3 hits)

duplicatesduplication

low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected

No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Old/deprecated-named symbol `hasLegacy` in tool/migrate_wc_leaderboard_anon.js:34

Names with suffixes like `_old`, `_v1`, `_deprecated` usually indicate replaced-but-not-removed code (typical AI-coder leftover). Confirm and delete, or rename if it's the active version.

old markerDead code

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Old/deprecated-named symbol `spellsLegacy` in tool/check_legacy_shapes.js:57

Names with suffixes like `_old`, `_v1`, `_deprecated` usually indicate replaced-but-not-removed code (typical AI-coder leftover). Confirm and delete, or rename if it's the active version.

old markerDead code

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — functions/test_comprehension_branch.js:156