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django

https://github.com/django/django · scanned 2026-05-16 16:20 UTC (1 day, 5 hours ago) · 10 languages

549 findings (48 legacy + 501 scanner) 8/10 scanners ran 75th percentile · Python · huge (>500K LoC) Scanner says 73 (higher by 2)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 day, 5 hours ago · v1 · 549 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
Combined
70.9
/100
Repobility
68
48 legacy
9-layer
73
100.0% cov · 501 gaps
Critical
3
click to filter
Agents
6
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
{# ── 2026-05-17 R27 #5: score breakdown panel ────────────────────── Surfaces the score_breakdown JSON that's been silently stored on Repository for months. Turns hidden math into a trust signal. #}
Score breakdown â 2026-05-17-v4 calibration-aware
Component Sub-score Weight Contribution
structure_score 60.0 0.15 9.00
security_score 69.5 0.25 17.38
testing_score 85.0 0.20 17.00
documentation_score 70.0 0.15 10.50
practices_score 90.0 0.15 13.50
code_quality 80.0 0.10 8.00
Overall 1.00 75.4
Calibrated penalty buckets (security_score): web: 1.6 · authz: 1.2 · threat: 27.8
security_score may be inflated — optional scanners skipped due to repo size/fast scan
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: severity: high × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 3 High 12 Medium 37 Low 350 Source: Legacy 48 9-layer 501 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 353 Security 34 Software 82 Frontend 2 Network 1 Cicd 54 Api 23
Scan summary Repository scanned at 73.4/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 41687 nodes across 23 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 501 findings — concentrated in quality (317), software (78), cicd (54). Risk profile is high: 2 critical, 3 high, 31 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 11 of 549 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
django/core/files/storage/filesystem.py:48 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
django/core/files/storage/base.py:174 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
django/core/cache/backends/redis.py:87 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software open_redirect conf 1.00 [SEC030] Open Redirect — user-controlled redirect target: Redirect target is taken directly from user input without validating that the destination is local to the site. Attackers craft phishing URLs that appear to come from your domain but land on attacker-controlled pages — common in OAuth callback flows, post-login redirects, and `next=` parameters. CWE-601.
Validate the redirect URL against an allowlist of safe destinations: # Django: from django.utils.http import url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme if not url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme(url, allowed_hosts={request.get_host()}): url = '/' # safe default Or restrict to relative paths only: `if…
django/views/i18n.py:56 open_redirectlegacy
high Legacy security injection conf 1.00 [SEC036] HTTP Header Injection / CRLF Injection: Setting an HTTP response header from user input without stripping CRLF lets attackers inject extra headers (Set-Cookie, etc.) or split the response. Real CVEs: CVE-2017-15193 (Mahara), CVE-2019-11358 (Django), CVE-2020-26116 (Python http.client). CWE-93/113.
Strip `\r\n` before setting headers: safe = value.replace('\r','').replace('\n','') response.headers['X-Custom'] = safe Most modern frameworks (Django 3+, Express 4.10+) already do this — but custom header-setting code often doesn't. Prefer framework methods (`response.set_cookie`) over manual …
django/middleware/csrf.py:258 injectionlegacy
high 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'eval_used' in django/db/migrations/questioner.py:168
Found a known-risky pattern (eval_used). Review and replace if possible.
django/db/migrations/questioner.py:168 owaspeval_used
high 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'eval_used' in scripts/manage_translations.py:403
Found a known-risky pattern (eval_used). Review and replace if possible.
scripts/manage_translations.py:403 owaspeval_used
high 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'exec_used' in django/core/management/commands/shell.py:88
Found a known-risky pattern (exec_used). Review and replace if possible.
django/core/management/commands/shell.py:88 owaspexec_used
high Legacy quality error_handling conf 1.00 [ERR001] Silent Exception Swallowing: Silently swallowing all exceptions hides bugs. Even in cleanup code, log at DEBUG level.
Log the error: `except Exception: logger.debug('cleanup failed', exc_info=True)`. Or handle specific exception types.
django/apps/config.py:112 error_handlinglegacy
high Legacy quality error_handling conf 1.00 [ERR001] Silent Exception Swallowing: Silently swallowing all exceptions hides bugs. Even in cleanup code, log at DEBUG level.
Log the error: `except Exception: logger.debug('cleanup failed', exc_info=True)`. Or handle specific exception types.
django/utils/http.py:146 error_handlinglegacy
high Legacy quality error_handling conf 1.00 [ERR001] Silent Exception Swallowing: Silently swallowing all exceptions hides bugs. Even in cleanup code, log at DEBUG level.
Log the error: `except Exception: logger.debug('cleanup failed', exc_info=True)`. Or handle specific exception types.
django/http/response.py:336 error_handlinglegacy
{# ── 2026-05-17 Round 14: AI-agent bridge footer ────────────────────── Discoverability: the /agents/voting/ guide + MCP manifest exist but aren't linked from anywhere users actually land. Small, opt-in footer. #}
For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.
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