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ymjo140/rendezvous

https://github.com/ymjo140/rendezvous · scanned 2026-06-16 01:06 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

120 raw signals (0 security + 120 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 114 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 6 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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100.0% cov · 114 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: severity: medium × excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 1 High 14 Medium 12 Low 76 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 114 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 11 Frontend 14 Security 17 Cicd 1 Quality 21 Api 50

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 67.7/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 1597 nodes across 30 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 120 findings — concentrated in api (50), quality (27), security (17). Risk profile is high: 1 critical, 14 high, 12 medium. Recommended next step: open the api layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 12 of 114 actionable findings. 120 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — components/ui/chart.tsx:83

Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html

Fq dangerous html

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/auth/callback/kakao/page.tsx:33

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/onboarding/page.tsx:41

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/places/[placeId]/page.tsx:381

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — lib/api-client.ts:33

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap

Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, ci, operator-readme. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in components/ui/chart.tsx:83

Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.

components/ui/chart.tsx:83 Dangerous innerhtml

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'local_storage_auth_token' in app/auth/callback/kakao/page.tsx:41

Found a known-risky pattern (local_storage_auth_token). Review and replace if possible.

app/auth/callback/kakao/page.tsx:41 Local storage auth token

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected

No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.

CI/CD securityCoverage

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 39 placeholder/mock markers across 18 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio

1 test file(s) for 193 source file(s) (ratio 0.01). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.

Coverage

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