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unhosted-ai/unhosted-core

https://github.com/unhosted-ai/unhosted-core · scanned 2026-06-16 00:45 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

38 raw signals (0 security + 38 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 34 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 4 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
47.4
/100
Security checks
47
0 findings
System graph
47
77.8% cov · 34 findings
Critical
0
click to filter
Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 1 Medium 13 Low 12 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 34 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 2 Hardware 4 Security 3 Cicd 3 Quality 22
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 47.4/100 with 77.8% coverage. It contains 453 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 38 findings — concentrated in quality (22), cicd (7), hardware (4). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 1 high, 17 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 26 of 34 actionable findings. 38 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'eval_used' in models/distill/pipeline.py:80
Found a known-risky pattern (eval_used). Review and replace if possible.
models/distill/pipeline.py:80 Eval used
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — crates/unhosted-core/web/ui.js:1229
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/settings.json
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/settings.json VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing tests. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 CI is configured but no tests are detected
A CI pipeline exists, but the scan found no test files to gate. Opus labeled this generated-code pattern as config theater: release machinery exists, but it has little behavioral signal.
CI/CDConfig theaterRepo hardening
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 3 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
docker/login-action@v3 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
lines 32, 40, 61
.github/workflows/docker.yml:32, 40, 61 (3 hits)
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 3 occurrences GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
3 files, 3 locations
.github/workflows/docker.yml
.github/workflows/pages.yml
.github/workflows/release.yml
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in crates/unhosted-core/web/ui.js:577
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
crates/unhosted-core/web/ui.js:577 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in docs/index.html:1448
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
docs/index.html:1448 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — models/distill/pipeline.py:49
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected
Found 13 placeholder/mock markers across 7 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.
Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
0 test file(s) for 44 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
Coverage
low System graph hardware Coverage conf 1.00 Containers defined but no K8s/orchestration manifest found
Repo has Dockerfiles/compose but no Kubernetes/Nomad manifests. If the target deployment is K8s, the manifests may live in a separate ops repo.
Deployment
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 105 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: debian:trixie-slim
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
Dockerfile:43 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: rust:1-slim-trixie
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
Dockerfile:22 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/deploy-pages@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/pages.yml:33 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — crates/unhosted-core/web/ui.js:2994
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: crates/unhosted-cli/src/main.rs (1891 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: crates/unhosted-core/src/agent.rs (2024 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: crates/unhosted-core/src/agent_fs.rs (1432 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: crates/unhosted-core/src/lib.rs (5564 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: crates/unhosted-core/web/ui.js (4367 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
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