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Issue title

Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive

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Top 5 (default)
Severity Rule Title File:line
CRIT generic-api-key Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive… src/cmds/cloud/aws_cmd.rs:2027
CRIT generic-api-key Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive… src/cmds/cloud/aws_cmd.rs:1915
CRIT generic-api-key Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive… src/cmds/cloud/aws_cmd.rs:1871
CRIT generic-api-key Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive… src/cmds/cloud/aws_cmd.rs:1870
CRIT generic-api-key Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive… scripts/benchmark/cloud-init.yaml:282
CRIT stripe-access-token Found a Stripe Access Token, posing a risk to payment processing services and sensitive f… SECURITY.md:153
CRIT MINED116 Workflow uses `secrets.RTK_DOCS_ANTHROPIC_KEY` on a `pull_request` trigger .github/workflows/ci.yml:284
HIGH SEC085 [SEC085] JS: child_process.exec with non-literal: child_process.exec with user-derived in… src/cmds/js/npm_cmd.rs:102
HIGH SEC029 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTT… src/cmds/cloud/wget_cmd.rs:34
HIGH MINED003 [MINED003] Rust Unwrap In Prod: .unwrap() panics if None/Err. Acceptable in tests; risky … src/cmds/js/tsc_cmd.rs:13
HIGH MINED003 [MINED003] Rust Unwrap In Prod: .unwrap() panics if None/Err. Acceptable in tests; risky … src/cmds/js/next_cmd.rs:47
HIGH MINED003 [MINED003] Rust Unwrap In Prod: .unwrap() panics if None/Err. Acceptable in tests; risky … src/analytics/ccusage.rs:231
HIGH MINED012 [MINED012] Curl Pipe Bash: curl ... | sh / bash — runs unverified network code. scripts/check-installation.sh:27
HIGH MINED126 Workflow container/services image `fedora:latest` unpinned .github/workflows/release.yml:136
HIGH MINED115 Action `dtolnay/rust-toolchain` pinned to mutable ref `@stable` .github/workflows/release.yml:65
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v4` .github/workflows/release.yml:62
HIGH MINED126 Workflow container/services image `semgrep/semgrep` unpinned .github/workflows/ci.yml:193
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v4` .github/workflows/ci.yml:238
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/setup-go` pinned to mutable ref `@v5` .github/workflows/ci.yml:221
HIGH MINED115 Action `Swatinem/rust-cache` pinned to mutable ref `@v2` .github/workflows/ci.yml:208
HIGH MINED115 Action `dtolnay/rust-toolchain` pinned to mutable ref `@stable` .github/workflows/ci.yml:206
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v4` .github/workflows/ci.yml:205
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v4` .github/workflows/ci.yml:195
HIGH MINED115 Action `Swatinem/rust-cache` pinned to mutable ref `@v2` .github/workflows/ci.yml:77
HIGH MINED115 Action `dtolnay/rust-toolchain` pinned to mutable ref `@stable` .github/workflows/ci.yml:75
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v4` .github/workflows/ci.yml:72
HIGH MINED115 Action `Swatinem/rust-cache` pinned to mutable ref `@v2` .github/workflows/ci.yml:64
HIGH MINED115 Action `dtolnay/rust-toolchain` pinned to mutable ref `@stable` .github/workflows/ci.yml:63
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v4` .github/workflows/ci.yml:62
HIGH MINED115 Action `Swatinem/rust-cache` pinned to mutable ref `@v2` .github/workflows/ci.yml:48
HIGH MINED115 Action `dtolnay/rust-toolchain` pinned to mutable ref `@stable` .github/workflows/ci.yml:45
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v4` .github/workflows/ci.yml:44
HIGH MINED115 Action `dtolnay/rust-toolchain` pinned to mutable ref `@stable` .github/workflows/ci.yml:34
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v4` .github/workflows/ci.yml:33
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v4` .github/workflows/ci.yml:21
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v4` .github/workflows/cd.yml:145
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/create-github-app-token` pinned to mutable ref `@v3` .github/workflows/cd.yml:139
HIGH MINED115 Action `googleapis/release-please-action` pinned to mutable ref `@v4` .github/workflows/cd.yml:114
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/create-github-app-token` pinned to mutable ref `@v3` .github/workflows/cd.yml:107
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v4` .github/workflows/cd.yml:29
MED SEC045 [SEC045] eval()/exec() on stored or user-supplied data: eval() and exec() on data — even … src/cmds/js/npm_cmd.rs:102
MED SEC045 [SEC045] eval()/exec() on stored or user-supplied data: eval() and exec() on data — even … hooks/pi/rtk.ts:32
MED MINED111 Bare except continues silently hooks/hermes/rtk-rewrite/__init__.py:74
MED DEPCUR-NPM npm package `rtk` is 4 major version(s) behind (>=0.28.0 -> 4.2.0) openclaw/package.json
MED AGT015 Remote install command pipes network code directly to a shell openclaw/README.md:22
MED AGT015 Remote install command pipes network code directly to a shell README_zh.md:61
MED AGT015 Remote install command pipes network code directly to a shell README_pt.md:61
MED AGT015 Remote install command pipes network code directly to a shell README_ko.md:60
MED AGT015 Remote install command pipes network code directly to a shell README_ja.md:60
MED AGT015 Remote install command pipes network code directly to a shell README_es.md:60
MED CORE_LARGE_FILES Average file size is 597 lines (recommend <300)
LOW COMP001 [COMP001] High cognitive complexity: Function `_pre_tool_call` has cognitive complexity 1… hooks/hermes/rtk-rewrite/__init__.py:40
LOW AIC003 Duplicated implementation block across source files src/cmds/system/format_cmd.rs:188
LOW AIC003 Duplicated implementation block across source files src/cmds/python/mypy_cmd.rs:129
INFO MINED043 [MINED043] Http Not Https: Hardcoded http:// (not localhost) for endpoints that handle cr… src/cmds/cloud/wget_cmd.rs:190
INFO MINED052 [MINED052] Ts Any Typed: : any used as type annotation. Defeats TypeScript type safety. openclaw/index.ts:39
INFO MINED044 [MINED044] Js Console Log Prod: console.log left in code. Should be replaced with logger … openclaw/index.ts:47
INFO MINED044 [MINED044] Js Console Log Prod: console.log left in code. Should be replaced with logger … hooks/pi/rtk.ts:45
INFO MINED044 [MINED044] Js Console Log Prod: console.log left in code. Should be replaced with logger … hooks/opencode/rtk.ts:14
INFO MINED066 [MINED066] Rust Panic Macro: panic!() unwinds the stack. Use Result for recoverable error… src/parser/mod.rs:36
INFO MINED066 [MINED066] Rust Panic Macro: panic!() unwinds the stack. Use Result for recoverable error… build.rs:35
INFO MINED059 [MINED059] Rust Expect In Prod: .expect(...) panics same as unwrap with a custom message. src/core/config.rs:218
INFO MINED059 [MINED059] Rust Expect In Prod: .expect(...) panics same as unwrap with a custom message. src/cmds/system/read.rs:251
INFO MINED059 [MINED059] Rust Expect In Prod: .expect(...) panics same as unwrap with a custom message. build.rs:16
Reset to top 5 64 findings available (after auto-suppression of test files + won't-fix)

Issue body (markdown)

## Code-quality scan: `rtk-ai/rtk`

**Score: 75/100 (C+)**  ·  89 findings  ·  scanned 2026-06-05 09:51 UTC  ·  71,604 LOC

| Severity | Count |
|---|---|
| CRITICAL | 7 |
| HIGH | 33 |
| MEDIUM | 11 |
| LOW | 3 |

📊 [Full filterable report](https://repobility.com/scan/ba9b93e4-31a5-4933-985a-32e596073110/)  ·  ![scorecard](https://repobility.com/scan/ba9b93e4-31a5-4933-985a-32e596073110/report.png?v=1780653090-s2)

### Top findings

1. **CRITICAL** `generic-api-key` — Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive 
   `src/cmds/cloud/aws_cmd.rs:2027`
2. **CRITICAL** `generic-api-key` — Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive 
   `src/cmds/cloud/aws_cmd.rs:1915`
3. **CRITICAL** `generic-api-key` — Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive 
   `src/cmds/cloud/aws_cmd.rs:1871`
4. **CRITICAL** `generic-api-key` — Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive 
   `src/cmds/cloud/aws_cmd.rs:1870`
5. **CRITICAL** `generic-api-key` — Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive 
   `scripts/benchmark/cloud-init.yaml:282`

---

_Filed automatically. Close this issue if not useful — we won't refile. Full report: https://repobility.com/scan/ba9b93e4-31a5-4933-985a-32e596073110/_
Already filed
This repo publishes a SECURITY.md policy and the scan contains 2 Critical/High security finding(s). Public issue filing would violate coordinated disclosure. Submit privately via the project's security reporting channel.
Megaproject â high spam risk
Could not determine 'rtk-ai/rtk' star count (GitHub API rate-limited or unreachable). When in doubt about repo size, prefer opening a focused PR or a discussion rather than an issue.
Already filed
60/92 findings (65%) on this scan are already flagged as test-file, won't-fix, or suppressed. The scan is too noisy to file as a single issue. Curate down to specific actionable findings, or address the FP source first.

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