alviehsan/Codex---SELISE-Meeting-App — Repobility public scan

Public scan — anyone with this URL can view this analysis. Sign up to track your own repos privately, run scheduled re-scans, and get AI fix prompts via your dashboard.

Sign up free Scan another repo

alviehsan/Codex---SELISE-Meeting-App

https://github.com/alviehsan/Codex---SELISE-Meeting-App · scanned 2026-06-17 01:32 UTC (1 month, 2 weeks ago)

36 raw signals (0 security + 36 graph)

File as issue Image

UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 month, 2 weeks ago · v2 · last Δ -9.2 (diff) · 32 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 4 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON

Security checks

100.0% cov · 32 findings

click to filter

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 2 High 0 Medium 13 Low 6 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 32 Crowd 0 Layer: Api 1 Frontend 1 Security 3 Cicd 3 Quality 24

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

Corpus Intelligence Cross-corpus context (cohort percentile, top patterns, fix plan) is shown only on repositories you own. Sign up and connect your repo to view it.

Scan summary Repository scanned at 67.5/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 619 nodes across 18 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 36 findings — concentrated in quality (26), cicd (5), security (3). Risk profile is high: 2 critical, 0 high, 17 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 21 of 32 actionable findings. 36 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in cloud/blocks-admin/README.md

Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.

cloud/blocks-admin/README.md:71

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in cloud/blocks-admin/setup-service-user.mjs

Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.

cloud/blocks-admin/setup-service-user.mjs:17

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — cloud/blocks-admin/provision-schemas.mjs:32

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — cloud/groq-proxy/src/blocks.js:114

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — cloud/groq-proxy/src/index.js:417

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — portal/src/lib/blocks.ts:142

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/cloud/blocks.ts:179

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/launch.json

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

.claude/launch.json VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 3 occurrences Frontend route `/activate` has no Link/navigate to it — portal/src/App.tsx

The route is registered but no `<Link to=…>` or `navigate(…)` in the codebase navigates here. Either it's reachable only via direct URL (intentional), it's dead, or the link broke during a refactor.

3 occurrences

repo-level (3 hits)

Orphan pageWiring

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 3 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

lines 52, 57, 151

.github/workflows/release.yml:52, 57, 151 (3 hits)

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/release.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/bump-version.mjs:24

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

scripts/bump-version.mjs:24 Node child process

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 42 placeholder/mock markers across 14 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 38 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/setup-node@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

.github/workflows/release.yml:62 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected

No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: src-tauri/src/lib.rs (5155 lines)

Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.

low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: src/App.tsx (3032 lines)

Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.

low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: src/ui/useMeetingDashboard.ts (2489 lines)

Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.

For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.

For AI agents + API integrations

Email me when this repo regresses

Free. We re-scan periodically; new criticals → your inbox. No signup required for the scan itself.

API access

This page is publicly accessible at: https://repobility.com/scan/bba83d71-dff9-4b08-94ac-8f8946138cd7/

To check status programmatically (no auth required):

curl -s https://repobility.com/api/v1/public/scan/bba83d71-dff9-4b08-94ac-8f8946138cd7/

Important — please don't re-submit the same URL repeatedly. The submission endpoint is idempotent: re-submitting the same git URL returns this same scan_token, not a new one. To re-scan this repo, sign up free and use the dashboard.