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zeriaxdev/oikotie-scraper

https://github.com/zeriaxdev/oikotie-scraper · scanned 2026-06-16 01:11 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

28 raw signals (0 security + 28 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 28 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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88.9% cov · 28 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 12 Low 10 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 28 Crowd 0 Layer: Api 1 Frontend 9 Security 4 Cicd 1 Quality 13

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 77.5/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 337 nodes across 3 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 28 findings — concentrated in quality (13), frontend (9), security (4). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 12 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 22 of 28 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/analysis/cost.ts:43

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/scraper/client.ts:38

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .mcp.json

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

.mcp.json VerificationMcp config

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license, ci, tests. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap

Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, ci, tests. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in src/api/index.ts:33

Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.

src/api/index.ts:33 Cors wildcard

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/api/index.html:179

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

src/api/index.html:179 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'insert_adjacent_html' in src/api/index.html:312

Found a known-risky pattern (insert_adjacent_html). Review and replace if possible.

src/api/index.html:312 Insert adjacent html

medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected

The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.

auth

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected

No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.

CI/CD securityCoverage

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 14 placeholder/mock markers across 5 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio

0 test file(s) for 53 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.

Coverage

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 145 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected

No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — src/api/index.ts:210