Public scan — anyone with this URL can view this analysis. Sign up to track your own repos privately, run scheduled re-scans, and get AI fix prompts via your dashboard.

zahidcseku/nat-test-ku

https://github.com/zahidcseku/nat-test-ku · scanned 2026-06-16 01:10 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

32 raw signals (0 security + 32 graph)

File as issue Image

UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 29 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 3 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON

77.8% cov · 29 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 2 Medium 16 Low 9 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 29 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 6 Network 1 Security 9 Cicd 2 Quality 11

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

Corpus Intelligence Cross-corpus context (cohort percentile, top patterns, fix plan) is shown only on repositories you own. Sign up and connect your repo to view it.

Scan summary Repository scanned at 54.1/100 with 77.8% coverage. It contains 332 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 32 findings — concentrated in quality (11), security (9), frontend (6). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 2 high, 17 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 24 of 29 actionable findings. 32 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: CLAUDE.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

CLAUDE.md:24 SecretsClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — frontend/js/application-lookup.js:48

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — frontend/js/payment-retry.js:63

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — frontend/js/registration.js:1040

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — frontend/test-content.js:4

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 2 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

SamKirkland/[email protected] can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

2 files, 2 locations

.github/workflows/build-css.yml:48

.github/workflows/upload_intake.yml:21

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in frontend/content-loader.js:132

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

frontend/content-loader.js:132 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in frontend/js/lib/dompurify.js:2

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

frontend/js/lib/dompurify.js:2 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in frontend/js/registration.js:1171

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

frontend/js/registration.js:1171 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in frontend/js/resources.js:24

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

frontend/js/resources.js:24 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in frontend/schedule.html:260

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

frontend/schedule.html:260 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 16 placeholder/mock markers across 9 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph network Security conf 1.00 Privileged port 21 in use

Port 21 is privileged (<1024). Make sure the service runs with the right caps or front it with a non-privileged port via a load balancer.

.github/workflows/build-css.yml Ports

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 57 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 3 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/checkout@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

2 files, 3 locations

.github/workflows/build-css.yml:18, 21 (2 hits)

.github/workflows/upload_intake.yml:18

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected

No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — frontend/content-loader.js:7