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tofutools/tclaude

https://github.com/tofutools/tclaude · scanned 2026-06-16 00:39 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

95 raw signals (0 security + 95 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 70 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 25 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
58.7
/100
Security checks
59
0 findings
System graph
59
77.8% cov · 70 findings
Critical
0
click to filter
Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 30 Low 13 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 70 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 1 Security 12 Cicd 3 Quality 54
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 58.7/100 with 77.8% coverage. It contains 1319 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 95 findings — concentrated in quality (54), cicd (28), security (12). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 37 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 43 of 70 actionable findings. 95 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/dnd.js:292
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/modal-cron.js:549
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/modal-link-wt.js:123
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/modal-spawn.js:643
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/plugins.js:338
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/refresh.js:925
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/row-actions.js:231
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: pkg/claude/agent/skills/agent-coord/SKILL.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
pkg/claude/agent/skills/agent-coord/SKILL.md VerificationSkill file
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: pkg/claude/agent/skills/agent-dir/SKILL.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
pkg/claude/agent/skills/agent-dir/SKILL.md VerificationSkill file
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: pkg/claude/agent/skills/agent-rename/SKILL.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
pkg/claude/agent/skills/agent-rename/SKILL.md VerificationSkill file
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: pkg/claude/agent/skills/agent-schedule/SKILL.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
pkg/claude/agent/skills/agent-schedule/SKILL.md VerificationSkill file
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: pkg/claude/agent/skills/human-notify/SKILL.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
pkg/claude/agent/skills/human-notify/SKILL.md VerificationSkill file
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing tests. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 CI is configured but no tests are detected
A CI pipeline exists, but the scan found no test files to gate. Opus labeled this generated-code pattern as config theater: release machinery exists, but it has little behavioral signal.
CI/CDConfig theaterRepo hardening
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 6 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
golangci/golangci-lint-action@v9 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
3 files, 6 locations
.github/workflows/release.yml:40, 112, 159 (3 hits)
.github/workflows/manual-release.yml:112, 157 (2 hits)
.github/workflows/ci.yml:33
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 3 occurrences GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
3 files, 3 locations
.github/workflows/docs.yml
.github/workflows/manual-release.yml
.github/workflows/release.yml
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/config.js:88
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/config.js:88 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/costs.js:184
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/costs.js:184 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/modal-cron.js:25
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/modal-cron.js:25 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/modal-link-wt.js:35
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/modal-link-wt.js:35 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/modal-message.js:101
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/modal-message.js:101 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/modal-spawn.js:96
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/modal-spawn.js:96 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/plugins.js:210
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/plugins.js:210 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/refresh.js:256
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/refresh.js:256 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/render.js:541
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/render.js:541 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/slop-credits.js:86
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/slop-credits.js:86 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/slop-fx.js:262
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/slop-fx.js:262 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/tabs.js:98
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/tabs.js:98 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected
Found 99 placeholder/mock markers across 46 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.
Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern
low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 19 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/checkout@v6 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
4 files, 19 locations
.github/workflows/manual-release.yml:28, 31, 46, 102, 107, 121, 132, 137 (8 hits)
.github/workflows/release.yml:29, 32, 54, 102, 107, 121, 134, 139 (8 hits)
.github/workflows/ci.yml:25, 28 (2 hits)
.github/workflows/docs.yml:43
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: pkg/claude/agent/groups.go (1620 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard.go (1415 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/refresh.js (2146 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard/js/row-actions.js (1406 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: pkg/claude/agentd/dashboard_edit.go (1442 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: pkg/claude/agentd/handlers.go (2927 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: pkg/claude/agentd/lifecycle.go (1767 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: pkg/claude/common/db/agent.go (1582 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: pkg/claude/common/db/migrate.go (2656 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: pkg/claude/conv/watch.go (1995 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: pkg/claude/session/hook_callback.go (1416 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
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