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dnissimi/chazarah

https://github.com/dnissimi/chazarah · scanned 2026-06-17 01:57 UTC (1 month, 1 week ago)

86 raw signals (0 security + 86 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 month, 1 week ago · v2 · last Δ -21.2 (diff) · 86 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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44.4% cov · 86 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

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Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 75 Low 8 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 86 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 3 Frontend 2 Security 69 Quality 12

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 55.5/100 with 44.4% coverage. It contains 444 nodes across 2 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 86 findings — concentrated in security (69), quality (12), software (3). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 75 medium. Recommended next step: open the security layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 83 of 86 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — scripts/snapshot-sefaria-taxonomy.ts:115

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/pages/api/submit.ts:69

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: skills/gemara-map/SKILL.md

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

skills/gemara-map/SKILL.md VerificationSkill file

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license, ci. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in public/maps/talmud/bava-kamma/70/en.html:760