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vppillai/kroki-server

https://github.com/vppillai/kroki-server · scanned 2026-06-16 00:52 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

57 raw signals (0 security + 57 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 32 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 25 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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Combined
75.7
/100
Security checks
76
0 findings
System graph
76
100.0% cov · 32 findings
Critical
0
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Agents
10
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Crowd
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Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 3 Medium 15 Low 9 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 32 Crowd 0 Layer: Hardware 2 Frontend 1 Security 12 Cicd 3 Quality 10 Api 4
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 75.7/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 455 nodes across 10 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 57 findings — concentrated in cicd (28), security (12), quality (10). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 3 high, 33 medium. Recommended next step: open the cicd layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 27 of 32 actionable findings. 57 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: GET /examples/${type}.txt (demoSite/js/modules/diagramOperations.js:96)
`demoSite/js/modules/diagramOperations.js:96` calls `GET /examples/${type}.txt` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/examples/<p>.txt` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the ma…
Dangling fetchFetch
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 Flask mutation route `ai_assist` without `@login_required` — demoSite/server.py:591
Flask route declares POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH methods without an auth decorator. Add `@login_required` (Flask-Login) or equivalent.
demoSite/server.py:591 securityAuth flask unauth route
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 Flask mutation route `validate_model` without `@login_required` — demoSite/server.py:480
Flask route declares POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH methods without an auth decorator. Add `@login_required` (Flask-Login) or equivalent.
demoSite/server.py:480 securityAuth flask unauth route
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — demoSite/js/ai-assistant-api.js:37
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — demoSite/js/config-ui-models.js:34
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — demoSite/js/main.js:287
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 16 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
docker/setup-buildx-action@v3 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
4 files, 16 locations
.github/workflows/ci.yml:84, 108, 131, 135, 143, 154 (6 hits)
.github/workflows/release.yml:21, 24, 32, 42, 62 (5 hits)
.github/workflows/build-kroki-core.yml:70, 73, 98, 101 (4 hits)
.github/workflows/pages.yml:42
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 4 occurrences GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
4 files, 4 locations
.github/workflows/build-kroki-core.yml
.github/workflows/ci.yml
.github/workflows/pages.yml
.github/workflows/release.yml
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in demoSite/js/ai-assistant-ui.js:22
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
demoSite/js/ai-assistant-ui.js:22 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in demoSite/js/ai-assistant.js:317
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
demoSite/js/ai-assistant.js:317 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in demoSite/js/code-history.js:70
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
demoSite/js/code-history.js:70 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in demoSite/js/config-ui-models.js:50
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
demoSite/js/config-ui-models.js:50 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in demoSite/js/modules/diagramOperations.js:63
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
demoSite/js/modules/diagramOperations.js:63 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in demoSite/js/modules/drawioIntegration.js:274
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
demoSite/js/modules/drawioIntegration.js:274 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in demoSite/js/modules/errors.js:100
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
demoSite/js/modules/errors.js:100 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in demoSite/js/modules/fullscreen.js:70
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
demoSite/js/modules/fullscreen.js:70 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'insert_adjacent_html' in demoSite/js/config-ui.js:39
Found a known-risky pattern (insert_adjacent_html). Review and replace if possible.
demoSite/js/config-ui.js:39 Insert adjacent html
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.
auth
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 14 env vars used in code but missing from .env.example
Drift between code and config docs. The first few: `AI_ACCESS_TOKEN`, `AI_DAILY_LIMIT_PER_IP`, `AI_MODEL_ALLOWLIST`, `AI_MODEL_FALLBACKS`, `AI_RETRY_PROMPT`, `AI_SYSTEM_PROMPT`, `AI_USER_PROMPT`, `DISABLED_DIAGRAM_TYPES` + 6 more. Add them (with a placeholder/comment) to .env.example so onboarding …
config drift
low System graph hardware Coverage conf 1.00 Containers defined but no K8s/orchestration manifest found
Repo has Dockerfiles/compose but no Kubernetes/Nomad manifests. If the target deployment is K8s, the manifests may live in a separate ops repo.
Deployment
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 20 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: python:3.12-alpine3.19
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
demoSite/Dockerfile:2 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 8 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/checkout@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
4 files, 8 locations
.github/workflows/pages.yml:39, 48, 61 (3 hits)
.github/workflows/build-kroki-core.yml:49, 60 (2 hits)
.github/workflows/release.yml:18, 59 (2 hits)
.github/workflows/ci.yml:91
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: ANY /
`demoSite/server.py` declares `ANY /` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: ANY /<path:filename>
`demoSite/server.py` declares `ANY /<path:filename>` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: ANY /api/health
`demoSite/server.py` declares `ANY /api/health` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
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