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tyejcoleman/headroom

https://github.com/tyejcoleman/headroom · scanned 2026-06-16 00:44 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

33 raw signals (0 security + 33 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 33 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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Combined
59.1
/100
Security checks
59
0 findings
System graph
59
66.7% cov · 33 findings
Critical
0
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 17 Low 3 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 33 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 1 Security 12 Cicd 1 Quality 19
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 59.1/100 with 66.7% coverage. It contains 369 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 33 findings — concentrated in quality (19), security (12), frontend (1). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 17 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 20 of 33 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — scripts/check-invariants.mjs:46
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/commands/run-evals.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/commands/run-evals.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/settings.json
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/settings.json VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction contains unpinned remote install: .claude/commands/release.md
Remote install commands in agent instructions are a supply-chain risk, especially when an agent can execute shell commands.
.claude/commands/release.md:42 Supply chainClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/release.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in eval/v1/grade-cell.mjs:10
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
eval/v1/grade-cell.mjs:10 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in eval/v1/setup-cell.mjs:10
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
eval/v1/setup-cell.mjs:10 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in eval/v2-continuity/grade-cell-large.mjs:15
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
eval/v2-continuity/grade-cell-large.mjs:15 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in eval/v2-continuity/grade-cell.mjs:11
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
eval/v2-continuity/grade-cell.mjs:11 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in eval/v2-continuity/setup-cell-large.mjs:13
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
eval/v2-continuity/setup-cell-large.mjs:13 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in eval/v2-continuity/setup-cell.mjs:12
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
eval/v2-continuity/setup-cell.mjs:12 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/release-preflight.mjs:11
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
scripts/release-preflight.mjs:11 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/arm.mjs:5
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
src/arm.mjs:5 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/doctor.mjs:5
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
src/doctor.mjs:5 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/handoff.mjs:1
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
src/handoff.mjs:1 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/install.mjs:5
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
src/install.mjs:5 Node child process
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 29 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Multiple root agent instruction files without precedence
The repo has multiple top-level AI-coder instruction files. Without precedence rules, different agents may follow different policies.
Governance
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
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