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tosnetwork/ios

https://github.com/tosnetwork/ios · scanned 2026-06-16 00:41 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

19 raw signals (0 security + 19 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 19 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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88.9% cov · 19 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 1 Medium 10 Low 6 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 19 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 1 Frontend 2 Cicd 3 Quality 12 Security 1

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 68.8/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 3277 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 19 findings — concentrated in quality (12), cicd (3), frontend (2). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 1 high, 10 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 17 of 19 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .codex/skills/figma-implement-design/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

.codex/skills/figma-implement-design/SKILL.md:178 SecretsCodex instruction

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — LocalPackages/TKLocalize/codegen/gpt-translate.js:20

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .codex/skills/pr/SKILL.md

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

.codex/skills/pr/SKILL.md VerificationCodex instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .codex/skills/tondocs/SKILL.md

.codex/skills/tondocs/SKILL.md VerificationCodex instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing tests. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 CI is configured but no tests are detected

A CI pipeline exists, but the scan found no test files to gate. Opus labeled this generated-code pattern as config theater: release machinery exists, but it has little behavioral signal.

CI/CDConfig theaterRepo hardening

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

webfactory/[email protected] can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

.github/workflows/mirror-public-push.yml:23 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/bump_version.yaml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — .codex/skills/pr/scripts/get_pr_data.py:41

`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — .codex/skills/tondocs/scripts/tondocs.py:51

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio

0 test file(s) for 5 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.

Coverage

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 23 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/checkout@v6 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

.github/workflows/mirror-public-push.yml:20 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Near-duplicate function bodies in 2 places

Functions with the same first-5-line body hash: .codex/skills/pr/scripts/get_pr_data.py:load_env_file, .codex/skills/tondocs/scripts/tondocs.py:load_env_file This is *the* AI-coder failure mode (4× more duplication in vibe-coded repos — see https://jw.hn/ai-code-hygiene). Consolidate or document w…

duplicatesduplication

low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: fetch_pr

No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.

.codex/skills/pr/scripts/get_pr_data.py:80

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — LocalPackages/TKLocalize/codegen/gpt-translate.js:105

Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak

Fq console leak

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