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ymansurozer/galley

https://github.com/ymansurozer/galley · scanned 2026-06-16 01:06 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

41 raw signals (0 security + 41 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 41 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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66.7% cov · 41 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

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Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 18 Low 4 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 41 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 2 Security 13 Cicd 1 Quality 25

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 59.0/100 with 66.7% coverage. It contains 425 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 41 findings — concentrated in quality (25), security (13), frontend (2). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 18 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 21 of 41 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — scripts/fetch-icons.mjs:40

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/server.test.ts:67

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/ui/store.ts:79

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: skills/galley/SKILL.md

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

skills/galley/SKILL.md VerificationSkill file

medium System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction contains unpinned remote install: skills/galley/SKILL.md

Remote install commands in agent instructions are a supply-chain risk, especially when an agent can execute shell commands.

skills/galley/SKILL.md:21 Supply chainSkill file

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/release.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in src/server.ts:62

Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.

src/server.ts:62 Cors wildcard

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/ui/annotations.ts:139