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xian-technology/xian-mcp-server

https://github.com/xian-technology/xian-mcp-server · scanned 2026-06-16 01:02 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

26 raw signals (0 security + 26 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 18 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 8 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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88.9% cov · 18 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 1 Medium 5 Low 9 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 18 Crowd 0 Layer: Hardware 2 Frontend 1 Security 3 Cicd 2 Quality 8 Api 2

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 71.6/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 230 nodes across 3 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 26 findings — concentrated in cicd (10), quality (8), security (3). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 1 high, 6 medium. Recommended next step: open the cicd layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 15 of 18 actionable findings. 26 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `call_tool` without auth dependency — http_server.py:92

`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.

http_server.py:92 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: mcp.json

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

mcp.json VerificationMcp config

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 2 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

astral-sh/setup-uv@v7 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

lines 53, 96

.github/workflows/ci.yml:53, 96 (2 hits)

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in http_server.py:75

Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.

http_server.py:75 Cors wildcard

medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected

The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.

auth

low System graph hardware Coverage conf 1.00 Containers defined but no K8s/orchestration manifest found

Repo has Dockerfiles/compose but no Kubernetes/Nomad manifests. If the target deployment is K8s, the manifests may live in a separate ops repo.

Deployment

low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: python:3.14-slim

Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.

Dockerfile:2 containersPinned dependencies

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 8 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/checkout@v6 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

lines 31, 36, 42, 48, 74, 79, 85, 91

.github/workflows/ci.yml:31, 36, 42, 48, 74, 79, 85, 91 (8 hits)

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Near-duplicate function bodies in 2 places

Functions with the same first-5-line body hash: xian_server.py:get_state_history, xian_server.py:get_state This is *the* AI-coder failure mode (4× more duplication in vibe-coded repos — see https://jw.hn/ai-code-hygiene). Consolidate or document why they're separate.

duplicatesduplication

low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected

No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /tools

`http_server.py` declares `GET /tools` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.

Unused endpoint

low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /tools/{tool_name}

`http_server.py` declares `POST /tools/{tool_name}` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.

Unused endpoint

low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: xian_server.py (2623 lines)

Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.

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