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Cure-HHT/hht_workflows

https://github.com/Cure-HHT/hht_workflows · scanned 2026-06-17 01:24 UTC (1 month, 2 weeks ago)

14 raw signals (0 security + 14 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 month, 2 weeks ago · v2 · last Δ -15.2 (diff) · 14 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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66.7% cov · 14 findings

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Severity: Critical 0 High 1 Medium 7 Low 3 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 14 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 1 Hardware 2 Security 1 Cicd 1 Quality 9

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 61.5/100 with 66.7% coverage. It contains 316 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 14 findings — concentrated in quality (9), hardware (2), software (1). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 1 high, 7 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 11 of 14 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'subprocess_shell_true' in hooks/release-notes-update/release_notes_update/__main__.py:32

Found a known-risky pattern (subprocess_shell_true). Review and replace if possible.

hooks/release-notes-update/release_notes_update/__main__.py:32 Subprocess shell true

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: CLAUDE.md

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

CLAUDE.md VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: .github/fixtures/cosign-verify/Dockerfile

No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.

Container

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/readiness-checks.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — hooks/release-notes-update/release_notes_update/git.py:8

`subprocess.check_output(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — scripts/urs-compile/build_docx_reference.py:404

`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — scripts/urs-compile/compile-urs.py:526

runtime safetyRobustness

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 7 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: alpine:3.20

Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.

.github/fixtures/cosign-verify/Dockerfile:1 containersPinned dependencies

low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: repl

No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.

scripts/urs-compile/compile-urs.py:223

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