Public scan — anyone with this URL can view this analysis. Sign up to track your own repos privately, run scheduled re-scans, and get AI fix prompts via your dashboard.
Sign up free Scan another repo
24 of your 133 findings came from Repobility's proprietary detections. ✓ Repobility tags below mark them.

Scan timing: clone 19.95s · analysis 4.28s · 46.2 MB · GitHub API rate-limit (preflight)

013677890/LCchat-Backend

https://github.com/013677890/LCchat-Backend · scanned 2026-06-16 03:37 UTC (2 months ago) · 10 languages

139 raw signals (122 security + 17 graph) 11/13 scanners ran 67th percentile · Go · medium (20-100K LoC) System graph score 82 (lower by 5)

File as issue Image
UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months ago · v1 · 74 actionable findings from 2 signal sources. 65 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
84.9
/100
Security checks
88
57 findings
System graph
82
100.0% cov · 17 findings
Critical
1
click to filter
Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Score breakdown â 2026-05-18-v5
Component Sub-score Weight Contribution
structure_score 85.0 0.15 12.75
security_score 100.0 0.25 25.00
testing_score 84.0 0.20 16.80
documentation_score 47.0 0.15 7.05
practices_score 54.0 0.15 8.10
code_quality 78.0 0.10 7.80
Overall 1.00 77.5
security_score may be inflated — optional security scanners were skipped on this fast scan
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 1 High 29 Medium 9 Low 14 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 57 System graph 17 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 30 Security 30 Cicd 9 Software 1 Hardware 3 Frontend 1
Corpus Intelligence Cross-corpus context (cohort percentile, top patterns, fix plan) is shown only on repositories you own. Sign up and connect your repo to view it.
Scan summary Repository scanned at 82.2/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 763 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 17 findings — concentrated in quality (11), hardware (3), frontend (1). Risk profile is high: 1 critical, 0 high, 6 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 53 of 74 actionable findings. 139 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in docker-compose.yml
Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.
docker-compose.yml:136
high Security checks security auth conf 0.70 [AUC003] Object-level route lacks visible authorization: A route with an object id-like parameter does not show nearby authentication or authorization evidence. This is a BOLA/IDOR review target. Endpoint: DELETE /:convId.
Add ownership, tenant, relationship, or policy checks before reading or mutating the target object.
apps/gateway/internal/router/router.go:246
high Security checks security auth conf 0.70 [AUC003] Object-level route lacks visible authorization: A route with an object id-like parameter does not show nearby authentication or authorization evidence. This is a BOLA/IDOR review target. Endpoint: DELETE /:groupUuid/apply.
Add ownership, tenant, relationship, or policy checks before reading or mutating the target object.
apps/gateway/internal/router/router.go:261
high Security checks security auth conf 0.70 [AUC003] Object-level route lacks visible authorization: A route with an object id-like parameter does not show nearby authentication or authorization evidence. This is a BOLA/IDOR review target. Endpoint: DELETE /:userUuid.
Add ownership, tenant, relationship, or policy checks before reading or mutating the target object.
apps/gateway/internal/router/router.go:230
high Security checks security auth conf 0.70 [AUC003] Object-level route lacks visible authorization: A route with an object id-like parameter does not show nearby authentication or authorization evidence. This is a BOLA/IDOR review target. Endpoint: DELETE /devices/:deviceId.
Add ownership, tenant, relationship, or policy checks before reading or mutating the target object.
apps/gateway/internal/router/router.go:195
high Security checks security auth conf 0.70 [AUC003] Object-level route lacks visible authorization: A route with an object id-like parameter does not show nearby authentication or authorization evidence. This is a BOLA/IDOR review target. Endpoint: GET /:groupUuid.
Add ownership, tenant, relationship, or policy checks before reading or mutating the target object.
apps/gateway/internal/router/router.go:257
high Security checks security auth conf 0.70 [AUC003] Object-level route lacks visible authorization: A route with an object id-like parameter does not show nearby authentication or authorization evidence. This is a BOLA/IDOR review target. Endpoint: GET /:groupUuid/my-join-application.
Add ownership, tenant, relationship, or policy checks before reading or mutating the target object.
apps/gateway/internal/router/router.go:262
high Security checks security auth conf 0.70 [AUC003] Object-level route lacks visible authorization: A route with an object id-like parameter does not show nearby authentication or authorization evidence. This is a BOLA/IDOR review target. Endpoint: GET /profile/:userUuid.
Add ownership, tenant, relationship, or policy checks before reading or mutating the target object.
apps/gateway/internal/router/router.go:189
high Security checks security auth conf 0.70 [AUC003] Object-level route lacks visible authorization: A route with an object id-like parameter does not show nearby authentication or authorization evidence. This is a BOLA/IDOR review target. Endpoint: PATCH /:groupUuid.
Add ownership, tenant, relationship, or policy checks before reading or mutating the target object.
apps/gateway/internal/router/router.go:258
high Security checks security auth conf 0.70 [AUC003] Object-level route lacks visible authorization: A route with an object id-like parameter does not show nearby authentication or authorization evidence. This is a BOLA/IDOR review target. Endpoint: POST /:groupUuid/apply.
Add ownership, tenant, relationship, or policy checks before reading or mutating the target object.
apps/gateway/internal/router/router.go:260
high Security checks security auth conf 0.70 [AUC003] Object-level route lacks visible authorization: A route with an object id-like parameter does not show nearby authentication or authorization evidence. This is a BOLA/IDOR review target. Endpoint: PUT /:groupUuid/notice.
Add ownership, tenant, relationship, or policy checks before reading or mutating the target object.
apps/gateway/internal/router/router.go:259
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility 2 occurrences [MINED118] Dockerfile FROM `golang:1.25-alpine` not pinned by digest: `FROM golang:1.25-alpine` resolves the tag at build time. The registry CAN re-push a different image for the same tag, so every build is potentially different. Production images should pin to `image@sha256:...` for reproducibility + supply-chain integrity.
Replace with: `FROM golang:1.25-alpine@sha256:<digest>`. Get the digest from `docker manifest inspect`. Re-pin via a scheduled bot (Renovate, Dependabot).
lines 1, 26
Dockerfile:1, 26 (2 hits)
low Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.84 5 occurrences Database service publishes a host port
Use `expose` for service-to-service access, bind to 127.0.0.1 for local-only access, or protect the port with firewall rules.
lines 1, 31, 47, 73, 125
docker-compose.yml:1, 31, 47, 73, 125 (5 hits)
CI/CD securitycontainers
medium Security checks security auth conf 0.92 [AUC001] No Repobility access matrix policy found: The repository uses web/API frameworks but does not define .repobility/access.yml or equivalent authorization documentation.
Add .repobility/access.yml mapping routes to anonymous, authenticated, owner, admin, and super_admin. Keep business-specific rules in the repo so CI can enforce them.
high Security checks security auth conf 0.74 [AUC002] Low visible authorization coverage in route inventory: Only 17.3% of discovered routes show nearby authentication, authorization, middleware, or public-route evidence.
Review the access matrix and add explicit framework auth declarations or policy-file exceptions for intentionally public routes.
high Security checks security auth conf 0.66 [AUC004] Admin route does not show super_admin separation: An administrative route was detected without nearby evidence that platform super_admin access is separated from tenant/application admin access. Endpoint: GET /health.
Define whether this endpoint is admin-only or super_admin-only, then enforce that distinction in code and .repobility/access.yml.
apps/connect/internal/server/server.go:70
high Security checks security auth conf 0.66 [AUC004] Admin route does not show super_admin separation: An administrative route was detected without nearby evidence that platform super_admin access is separated from tenant/application admin access. Endpoint: GET /metrics.
Define whether this endpoint is admin-only or super_admin-only, then enforce that distinction in code and .repobility/access.yml.
apps/connect/internal/server/server.go:77
high Security checks security auth conf 0.66 [AUC004] Admin route does not show super_admin separation: An administrative route was detected without nearby evidence that platform super_admin access is separated from tenant/application admin access. Endpoint: GET /ws.
Define whether this endpoint is admin-only or super_admin-only, then enforce that distinction in code and .repobility/access.yml.
apps/connect/internal/server/server.go:85
high Security checks security auth conf 0.66 [AUC004] Admin route does not show super_admin separation: An administrative route was detected without nearby evidence that platform super_admin access is separated from tenant/application admin access. Endpoint: PATCH /settings.
Define whether this endpoint is admin-only or super_admin-only, then enforce that distinction in code and .repobility/access.yml.
apps/gateway/internal/router/router.go:247
high Security checks security auth conf 0.68 [AUC009] Sensitive function route lacks elevated authorization evidence: A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: GET /devices.
Require an explicit admin, maintainer, super_admin, or scoped service role in code and .repobility/access.yml.
apps/gateway/internal/router/router.go:194
high Security checks security auth conf 0.68 [AUC009] Sensitive function route lacks elevated authorization evidence: A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: GET /Origin.
Require an explicit admin, maintainer, super_admin, or scoped service role in code and .repobility/access.yml.
apps/gateway/internal/middleware/cors.go:33
high Security checks security auth conf 0.68 [AUC009] Sensitive function route lacks elevated authorization evidence: A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: GET /profile/:userUuid.
Require an explicit admin, maintainer, super_admin, or scoped service role in code and .repobility/access.yml.
apps/gateway/internal/router/router.go:189
high Security checks security auth conf 0.68 [AUC009] Sensitive function route lacks elevated authorization evidence: A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: GET /qrcode.
Require an explicit admin, maintainer, super_admin, or scoped service role in code and .repobility/access.yml.
apps/gateway/internal/router/router.go:192
high Security checks security auth conf 0.68 [AUC009] Sensitive function route lacks elevated authorization evidence: A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: GET /search.
Require an explicit admin, maintainer, super_admin, or scoped service role in code and .repobility/access.yml.
apps/gateway/internal/router/router.go:190
high Security checks security auth conf 0.68 [AUC009] Sensitive function route lacks elevated authorization evidence: A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: POST /avatar.
Require an explicit admin, maintainer, super_admin, or scoped service role in code and .repobility/access.yml.
apps/gateway/internal/router/router.go:191
high Security checks security auth conf 0.68 [AUC009] Sensitive function route lacks elevated authorization evidence: A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: POST /batch-profile.
Require an explicit admin, maintainer, super_admin, or scoped service role in code and .repobility/access.yml.
apps/gateway/internal/router/router.go:193
high Security checks security auth conf 0.68 [AUC009] Sensitive function route lacks elevated authorization evidence: A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: POST /parse-qrcode.
Require an explicit admin, maintainer, super_admin, or scoped service role in code and .repobility/access.yml.
apps/gateway/internal/router/router.go:172
high Security checks security auth conf 0.68 [AUC009] Sensitive function route lacks elevated authorization evidence: A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: POST /refresh-token.
Require an explicit admin, maintainer, super_admin, or scoped service role in code and .repobility/access.yml.
apps/gateway/internal/router/router.go:170
high Security checks security auth conf 0.68 [AUC009] Sensitive function route lacks elevated authorization evidence: A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: POST /verify-code.
Require an explicit admin, maintainer, super_admin, or scoped service role in code and .repobility/access.yml.
apps/gateway/internal/router/router.go:171
medium Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.74 2 occurrences Database service has no persistent data volume
Mount the database data directory to a named Docker volume or managed persistent disk, and document backup and restore testing.
lines 47, 73
docker-compose.yml:47, 73 (2 hits)
CI/CD securitycontainers
high Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.82 Docker final stage has no non-root USER
Add a non-root USER in the final runtime stage after files and permissions are prepared.
Dockerfile:27 CI/CD securitycontainers
medium Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.76 Dockerfile copies broad context with incomplete .dockerignore
Tighten .dockerignore or replace COPY . with explicit COPY statements.
Dockerfile:14 CI/CD securitycontainers
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license, ci. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — scripts/gateway_blackbox_test.py:343
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected
No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.
CI/CD securityCoverage
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected
Found 19 placeholder/mock markers across 6 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.
Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern
low Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.72 .dockerignore misses sensitive defaults
Add missing patterns such as .env, .git, private keys, certificates, dependency folders, and local databases.
.dockerignore CI/CD securitycontainers
low Security checks quality Error handling conf 1.00 3 occurrences [ERR003] Ignored Error (Go): Ignoring error return values.
Handle the error or use errcheck linter.
3 files, 3 locations
apps/auth/cmd/app.go:176
apps/connect/internal/manager/client.go:271
apps/connect/internal/manager/connection_manager.go:275
high Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.56 8 occurrences Compose service does not declare a runtime user
Set a non-root `user:` in Compose or ensure the final image stage has a non-root USER directive.
lines 149, 193, 237, 274, 312, 351, 392, 425
docker-compose.yml:149, 193, 237, 274, 312, 351, 392, 425 (8 hits)
CI/CD securitycontainers
high Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.62 8 occurrences Compose service lacks no-new-privileges hardening
Add `security_opt: ["no-new-privileges:true"]` unless the service has a documented need for privilege escalation.
lines 149, 193, 237, 274, 312, 351, 392, 425
docker-compose.yml:149, 193, 237, 274, 312, 351, 392, 425 (8 hits)
CI/CD securitycontainers
low Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.58 Database password is wired through an environment variable placeholder
Prefer Compose secrets or your platform secret manager with *_FILE variables where the image supports them. Rotate only if a real value was committed.
docker-compose.yml:1 CI/CD securitycontainers
low Security checks quality Quality conf 0.60 30 occurrences Duplicated implementation block across source files
Duplicate implementation blocks are maintenance debt. Keep them visible, but they are not a high-severity defect unless the duplicated logic is security-sensitive or drifting.
12 files, 19 locations
apps/msg/cmd/app.go:81, 87, 96 (3 hits)
apps/user/cmd/app.go:80, 147, 148 (3 hits)
apps/group/cmd/app.go:93, 108 (2 hits)
apps/relation/cmd/app.go:10, 93 (2 hits)
apps/relation/internal/repository/friend_repository.go:1, 464 (2 hits)
apps/connect/cmd/main.go:1
apps/gateway/cmd/app.go:179
apps/gateway/cmd/main.go:1
duplicationquality
low Security checks quality Documentation No LICENSE file
Add a LICENSE file to your repository. Use choosealicense.com to pick the right license (MIT for permissive, Apache 2.0 for patent protection, GPL for copyleft).
low System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap
Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, ci. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: alpine:3.21
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
Dockerfile:26 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: golang:1.25-alpine
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
Dockerfile:1 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Near-duplicate function bodies in 2 places
Functions with the same first-5-line body hash: scripts/gateway_blackbox_test.py:redis_set_direct, scripts/gateway_blackbox_test.py:redis_set This is *the* AI-coder failure mode (4× more duplication in vibe-coded repos — see https://jw.hn/ai-code-hygiene). Consolidate or document why they're separ…
duplicatesduplication
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: apps/group/internal/repository/group_repository.go (2026 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: scripts/gateway_blackbox_test.py (1674 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.
For AI agents + API integrations
Email me when this repo regresses
Free. We re-scan periodically; new criticals → your inbox. No signup required for the scan itself.
API access

This page is publicly accessible at: https://repobility.com/scan/d8c38c70-439c-420c-848b-27b4a69a486b/

To check status programmatically (no auth required): 

curl -s https://repobility.com/api/v1/public/scan/d8c38c70-439c-420c-848b-27b4a69a486b/

Important — please don't re-submit the same URL repeatedly. The submission endpoint is idempotent: re-submitting the same git URL returns this same scan_token, not a new one. To re-scan this repo, sign up free and use the dashboard.