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andreafinazziinfo/TV-Oracle-Bridge

https://github.com/andreafinazziinfo/TV-Oracle-Bridge · scanned 2026-06-17 01:33 UTC (1 month, 2 weeks ago)

37 raw signals (0 security + 37 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 month, 2 weeks ago · v2 · last Δ +5.4 (diff) · 35 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 2 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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100.0% cov · 35 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

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Severity: Critical 0 High 1 Medium 10 Low 21 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 35 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 7 Frontend 1 Hardware 2 Security 3 Cicd 2 Quality 14 Api 6

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 82.1/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 370 nodes across 27 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 37 findings — concentrated in quality (14), software (7), api (6). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 1 high, 10 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 32 of 35 actionable findings. 37 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: GET https://www.tradingview.com/accounts/signin/status/ (session_helper.mjs:99)

`session_helper.mjs:99` calls `GET https://www.tradingview.com/accounts/signin/status/` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/https:/www.tradingview.com/accounts/signin/status` If this points at an external…

Dangling fetchFetch

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — apply-lib-patch.mjs:6

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — dashboard/public/app.js:821

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — dashboard/server.mjs:412

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — session_helper.mjs:99

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: Dockerfile

No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.

Container

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in dashboard/public/app.js:136

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

dashboard/public/app.js:136 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in dashboard/server.mjs:4

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

dashboard/server.mjs:4 Node child process

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — mcp_server.py:62

`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected

The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.

auth

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 13 env vars used in code but missing from .env.example

Drift between code and config docs. The first few: `MCP_HOST`, `MCP_PORT`, `MCP_TRANSPORT`, `NODE_ENV`, `PORT`, `TV_BROWSER_HEADLESS`, `TV_BROWSER_PATH`, `TV_BROWSER_TYPE` + 5 more. Add them (with a placeholder/comment) to .env.example so onboarding doesn't break.

config drift

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 130 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: mcr.microsoft.com/playwright:v1.45.0-noble

Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.

Dockerfile:3 containersPinned dependencies

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 3 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/checkout@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

lines 15, 18, 23

.github/workflows/ci.yml:15, 18, 23 (3 hits)

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph quality dependencies conf 1.00 Node manifest has dependencies but no lockfile: package.json

`package.json` declares dependencies, but no same-directory npm/pnpm/yarn/bun lockfile was found. Generated projects without lockfiles are less reproducible and harder to secure-scan precisely.

package.json LockfileReproducibilityGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Old/deprecated-named symbol `MyIndicator_v2` in tests/test_bridge_utils_edge_cases.py:23

Names with suffixes like `_old`, `_v1`, `_deprecated` usually indicate replaced-but-not-removed code (typical AI-coder leftover). Confirm and delete, or rename if it's the active version.

old markerDead code

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 package.json defines install-time lifecycle scripts

preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare scripts execute during dependency installation. Review them carefully for network calls, obfuscation, shell execution, or credential access.

package.json CI/CD securitySupply chainNpm

low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: local_cycle_reversal_long