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varutyunov/carfactory-daily-report

https://github.com/varutyunov/carfactory-daily-report · scanned 2026-06-16 02:58 UTC (2 months ago)

38 raw signals (0 security + 38 graph)

UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months ago · v2 · 38 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 71.9/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 351 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 38 findings — concentrated in quality (17), security (15), frontend (5). Risk profile is high: 2 critical, 1 high, 22 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 34 of 38 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in check_syntax.js
Detected pattern matching generic_api_key. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.
check_syntax.js:127
critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in index_preview.html
Detected pattern matching generic_api_key. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.
index_preview.html:1414
high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: CLAUDE.md
Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.
CLAUDE.md:90 SecretsClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — bot.js:29
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — check_syntax.js:185
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — google-apps-script.js:1491
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — supabase-js.min.js:1
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license, ci, tests, operator-readme. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap
Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, ci, tests, operator-readme. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in board-preview.html:253
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
board-preview.html:253 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in check_syntax.js:111
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
check_syntax.js:111 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in do_cal_upgrade.py:134
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
do_cal_upgrade.py:134 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in fix_cards.py:41
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
fix_cards.py:41 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in index_preview.html:1395
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
index_preview.html:1395 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in index_v3_9.html:503
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
index_v3_9.html:503 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in profit-preview.html:213
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
profit-preview.html:213 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in sign.html:205
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
sign.html:205 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_outerhtml_assignment' in check_syntax.js:114
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_outerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
check_syntax.js:114 Direct outerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_outerhtml_assignment' in index_preview.html:1398
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_outerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
index_preview.html:1398 Direct outerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'local_storage_auth_token' in check_syntax.js:335
Found a known-risky pattern (local_storage_auth_token). Review and replace if possible.
check_syntax.js:335 Local storage auth token
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'local_storage_auth_token' in index_preview.html:1686
Found a known-risky pattern (local_storage_auth_token). Review and replace if possible.
index_preview.html:1686 Local storage auth token
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — backup-photos.py:40
`urllib.request.urlopen(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected
No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.
CI/CD securityCoverage
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
0 test file(s) for 14 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
Coverage
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 70 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Icon-only button without accessible name — check_syntax.js:161
A `<button>` whose only child is a single glyph or symbol needs `title=` or `aria-label=` so screen readers (and tooltips on hover) work. Why: P3 in CHECKLIST.md — icon-only buttons skipped a title. Rule id: fq.button.no-label
Fq button no label
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Docs conf 1.00 README lacks setup or run instructions
A README exists, but it does not contain common install/setup/run markers. This matches a frequent generated-code pattern: UI is present, operational handoff is thin.
ReadmeRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — bot.js:134
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — check_syntax.js:178
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — supabase-js.min.js:3
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: check_syntax.js (2318 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: google-apps-script.js (3477 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
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