free-claude-code

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https://github.com/Alishahryar1/free-claude-code.git · scanned 2026-05-17 02:50 UTC (14 hours, 34 minutes ago) · 10 languages

218 findings (28 legacy + 190 scanner) 86th percentile · Python · medium (20-100K LoC) Scanner says 86 (lower by 6)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 14 hours, 34 minutes ago · v2 · 123 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

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Active filters: severity: high × excluding tests × Reset all

Scan summary Repository scanned at 86.0/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 3046 nodes across 19 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 95 findings — concentrated in quality (41), software (31), api (17). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 4 high, 3 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 11 of 123 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Legacy security auth conf 0.70 [AUC003] Object-level route lacks visible authorization: A route with an object id-like parameter does not show nearby authentication or authorization evidence. This is a BOLA/IDOR review target. Endpoint: POST /admin/api/providers/{provider_id}/test.

A route with an object id-like parameter does not show nearby authentication or authorization evidence. This is a BOLA/IDOR review target. Endpoint: POST /admin/api/providers/{provider_id}/test.

api/admin_routes.py:172 authlegacy

high Legacy security path_traversal conf 0.80 [SEC013] Path Traversal — User Input in File Path: User-controlled input used in file path without sanitization. Allows reading arbitrary files.

Use os.path.realpath() and verify the path starts with your expected base directory. Use secure_filename() for uploads.

cli/entrypoints.py:131 path_traversallegacy

high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.

Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…

api/runtime.py:105 ssrflegacy

api/admin_urls.py:19 ssrflegacy

api/admin_routes.py:167 ssrflegacy

high Legacy software prototype_pollution conf 1.00 [SEC033] Prototype Pollution — unfiltered merge of user object: Merging user-controlled object into a target without filtering `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys lets attackers inject properties onto Object.prototype, affecting every object in the process. CWE-1321. Real-world: CVE-2019-10744 (lodash), CVE-2021-23337 (lodash.set), CVE-2023-26136 (tough-cookie).

Sanitize keys BEFORE merge: function sanitize(obj) { delete obj.__proto__; delete obj.constructor; delete obj.prototype; return obj; } Or use Object.create(null) for the target. Or use Map() for user-key-indexed data. Upgrade lodash >= 4.17.21 for partial mitigation.

api/admin_static/admin.js:301 prototype_pollutionlegacy

high 9-layer security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `apply_admin_config` without auth dependency — api/admin_routes.py:109

`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.

api/admin_routes.py:109 authowaspauth.fastapi.unauth_mutation

high 9-layer security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `refresh_models` without auth dependency — api/admin_routes.py:197

`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.

api/admin_routes.py:197 authowaspauth.fastapi.unauth_mutation

high 9-layer security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `test_provider` without auth dependency — api/admin_routes.py:172

`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.

api/admin_routes.py:172 authowaspauth.fastapi.unauth_mutation

high 9-layer security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `validate_admin_config` without auth dependency — api/admin_routes.py:103

`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.

api/admin_routes.py:103 authowaspauth.fastapi.unauth_mutation

high Legacy quality error_handling conf 1.00 [ERR001] Silent Exception Swallowing: Silently swallowing all exceptions hides bugs. Even in cleanup code, log at DEBUG level.

Log the error: `except Exception: logger.debug('cleanup failed', exc_info=True)`. Or handle specific exception types.

messaging/limiter.py:134 error_handlinglegacy

{# ── 2026-05-17 Round 14: AI-agent bridge footer ────────────────────── Discoverability: the /agents/voting/ guide + MCP manifest exist but aren't linked from anywhere users actually land. Small, opt-in footer. #}

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