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free-claude-code

https://github.com/Alishahryar1/free-claude-code.git · scanned 2026-05-17 02:50 UTC (13 hours, 32 minutes ago) · 10 languages

218 findings (28 legacy + 190 scanner) 87th percentile · Python · medium (20-100K LoC) Scanner says 86 (lower by 6)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 13 hours, 32 minutes ago · v2 · 123 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
Combined
82.2
/100
Repobility
78
28 legacy
9-layer
86
88.9% cov · 95 gaps
Critical
0
click to filter
Agents
6
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: source: legacy × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 11 Medium 21 Low 89 Source: Legacy 28 9-layer 95 Crowd 0 Layer: Security 21 Software 37 Quality 47 Frontend 1 Api 17
Scan summary Repository scanned at 86.0/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 3046 nodes across 19 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 95 findings — concentrated in quality (41), software (31), api (17). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 4 high, 3 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 28 of 123 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Legacy security auth conf 0.70 [AUC003] Object-level route lacks visible authorization: A route with an object id-like parameter does not show nearby authentication or authorization evidence. This is a BOLA/IDOR review target. Endpoint: POST /admin/api/providers/{provider_id}/test.
A route with an object id-like parameter does not show nearby authentication or authorization evidence. This is a BOLA/IDOR review target. Endpoint: POST /admin/api/providers/{provider_id}/test.
api/admin_routes.py:172 authlegacy
high Legacy security path_traversal conf 0.80 [SEC013] Path Traversal — User Input in File Path: User-controlled input used in file path without sanitization. Allows reading arbitrary files.
Use os.path.realpath() and verify the path starts with your expected base directory. Use secure_filename() for uploads.
cli/entrypoints.py:131 path_traversallegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
api/runtime.py:105 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
api/admin_urls.py:19 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
api/admin_routes.py:167 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software prototype_pollution conf 1.00 [SEC033] Prototype Pollution — unfiltered merge of user object: Merging user-controlled object into a target without filtering `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys lets attackers inject properties onto Object.prototype, affecting every object in the process. CWE-1321. Real-world: CVE-2019-10744 (lodash), CVE-2021-23337 (lodash.set), CVE-2023-26136 (tough-cookie).
Sanitize keys BEFORE merge: function sanitize(obj) { delete obj.__proto__; delete obj.constructor; delete obj.prototype; return obj; } Or use Object.create(null) for the target. Or use Map() for user-key-indexed data. Upgrade lodash >= 4.17.21 for partial mitigation.
api/admin_static/admin.js:301 prototype_pollutionlegacy
medium Legacy security auth conf 0.92 [AUC001] No Repobility access matrix policy found: The repository uses web/API frameworks but does not define .repobility/access.yml or equivalent authorization documentation.
The repository uses web/API frameworks but does not define .repobility/access.yml or equivalent authorization documentation.
authlegacy
medium Legacy security auth conf 0.74 [AUC002] Low visible authorization coverage in route inventory: Only 33.3% of discovered routes show nearby authentication, authorization, middleware, or public-route evidence.
Only 33.3% of discovered routes show nearby authentication, authorization, middleware, or public-route evidence.
authlegacy
medium Legacy security auth conf 0.66 [AUC004] Admin route does not show super_admin separation: An administrative route was detected without nearby evidence that platform super_admin access is separated from tenant/application admin access. Endpoint: GET /admin.
An administrative route was detected without nearby evidence that platform super_admin access is separated from tenant/application admin access. Endpoint: GET /admin.
api/admin_routes.py:83 authlegacy
medium Legacy security auth conf 0.66 [AUC004] Admin route does not show super_admin separation: An administrative route was detected without nearby evidence that platform super_admin access is separated from tenant/application admin access. Endpoint: GET /admin/api/config.
An administrative route was detected without nearby evidence that platform super_admin access is separated from tenant/application admin access. Endpoint: GET /admin/api/config.
api/admin_routes.py:97 authlegacy
medium Legacy security auth conf 0.66 [AUC004] Admin route does not show super_admin separation: An administrative route was detected without nearby evidence that platform super_admin access is separated from tenant/application admin access. Endpoint: GET /admin/api/providers/local-status.
An administrative route was detected without nearby evidence that platform super_admin access is separated from tenant/application admin access. Endpoint: GET /admin/api/providers/local-status.
api/admin_routes.py:160 authlegacy
medium Legacy security auth conf 0.66 [AUC004] Admin route does not show super_admin separation: An administrative route was detected without nearby evidence that platform super_admin access is separated from tenant/application admin access. Endpoint: GET /admin/api/status.
An administrative route was detected without nearby evidence that platform super_admin access is separated from tenant/application admin access. Endpoint: GET /admin/api/status.
api/admin_routes.py:137 authlegacy
medium Legacy security auth conf 0.66 [AUC004] Admin route does not show super_admin separation: An administrative route was detected without nearby evidence that platform super_admin access is separated from tenant/application admin access. Endpoint: GET /admin/assets/{filename}.
An administrative route was detected without nearby evidence that platform super_admin access is separated from tenant/application admin access. Endpoint: GET /admin/assets/{filename}.
api/admin_routes.py:89 authlegacy
medium Legacy security auth conf 0.66 [AUC004] Admin route does not show super_admin separation: An administrative route was detected without nearby evidence that platform super_admin access is separated from tenant/application admin access. Endpoint: POST /admin/api/config/apply.
An administrative route was detected without nearby evidence that platform super_admin access is separated from tenant/application admin access. Endpoint: POST /admin/api/config/apply.
api/admin_routes.py:109 authlegacy
medium Legacy security auth conf 0.66 [AUC004] Admin route does not show super_admin separation: An administrative route was detected without nearby evidence that platform super_admin access is separated from tenant/application admin access. Endpoint: POST /admin/api/config/validate.
An administrative route was detected without nearby evidence that platform super_admin access is separated from tenant/application admin access. Endpoint: POST /admin/api/config/validate.
api/admin_routes.py:103 authlegacy
medium Legacy security auth conf 0.66 [AUC004] Admin route does not show super_admin separation: An administrative route was detected without nearby evidence that platform super_admin access is separated from tenant/application admin access. Endpoint: POST /admin/api/models/refresh.
An administrative route was detected without nearby evidence that platform super_admin access is separated from tenant/application admin access. Endpoint: POST /admin/api/models/refresh.
api/admin_routes.py:197 authlegacy
medium Legacy security auth conf 0.66 [AUC004] Admin route does not show super_admin separation: An administrative route was detected without nearby evidence that platform super_admin access is separated from tenant/application admin access. Endpoint: POST /admin/api/providers/{provider_id}/test.
An administrative route was detected without nearby evidence that platform super_admin access is separated from tenant/application admin access. Endpoint: POST /admin/api/providers/{provider_id}/test.
api/admin_routes.py:172 authlegacy
medium Legacy security auth conf 0.66 [AUC004] Admin route does not show super_admin separation: An administrative route was detected without nearby evidence that platform super_admin access is separated from tenant/application admin access. Endpoint: POST /stop.
An administrative route was detected without nearby evidence that platform super_admin access is separated from tenant/application admin access. Endpoint: POST /stop.
api/routes.py:241 authlegacy
medium Legacy security auth conf 0.68 [AUC009] Sensitive function route lacks elevated authorization evidence: A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: POST /v1/messages/count_tokens.
A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: POST /v1/messages/count_tokens.
api/routes.py:182 authlegacy
medium Legacy security auth conf 0.72 [AUC012] FastAPI interactive docs may be exposed by framework defaults: FastAPI exposes /docs, /redoc, and /openapi.json by default. Public production APIs should explicitly disable those defaults, protect them behind admin authentication, or publish a reviewed OpenAPI spec with declared security requirements.
FastAPI exposes /docs, /redoc, and /openapi.json by default. Public production APIs should explicitly disable those defaults, protect them behind admin authentication, or publish a reviewed OpenAPI spec with declared security requirements.
authlegacy
high Legacy quality error_handling conf 1.00 [ERR001] Silent Exception Swallowing: Silently swallowing all exceptions hides bugs. Even in cleanup code, log at DEBUG level.
Log the error: `except Exception: logger.debug('cleanup failed', exc_info=True)`. Or handle specific exception types.
messaging/limiter.py:134 error_handlinglegacy
medium Legacy software redos conf 1.00 [SEC031] Catastrophic Backtracking Regex (ReDoS): Regex contains nested quantifiers like `(a+)+` or quantified alternation with overlapping branches. On adversarial input these patterns exhibit exponential backtracking, freezing the process. CWE-1333. Real CVEs: CVE-2017-16129 (minimatch), CVE-2021-3807 (ansi-regex), and dozens more.
Three options, pick one: 1. Rewrite the pattern to avoid nested quantifiers. E.g. `(a+)+` is functionally equivalent to `a+` for matching purposes. 2. Use Google's re2 (`pip install google-re2`): linear-time, drop-in replacement for `re` for most use cases. 3. Set a hard timeout: `s…
messaging/rendering/markdown_tables.py:7 redoslegacy
medium Legacy software log_injection conf 1.00 [SEC034] Log Injection / Log Forging — unsanitized user input in log: User input is logged without sanitizing newlines or control characters. Attackers inject `\n` to forge fake log entries, hide tracks, or exploit downstream log parsers (SIEM, splunk). Combined with template injection this can escalate to RCE (CVE-2021-44228 log4shell). CWE-117.
Strip control characters before logging: safe = user_input.replace('\n','').replace('\r','').replace('\x00','') logger.info('User action: %s', safe) Always use parameterized logging (`%s` + args), never f-strings or string concat — that's also what mitigates log4shell-style attacks. For structu…
messaging/platforms/telegram.py:512 log_injectionlegacy
medium Legacy quality quality conf 0.72 Agent control bridge may listen on a network interface without visible auth
Agent, MCP, sidecar, and command bridge servers often start as local helpers. Binding them to 0.0.0.0 or a default all-interface listener without an authorization guard can expose tool execution or session data to the LAN.
server.py:5 qualitylegacy
medium Legacy quality quality conf 0.78 Public web service has no security.txt
security.txt gives researchers and customers a safe disclosure channel. Public web apps and APIs should publish it under /.well-known/security.txt.
.well-known/security.txt qualitylegacy
low Legacy quality quality conf 0.86 Duplicated implementation block across source files
Duplicated blocks are a common artifact when generated code is pasted or recreated instead of reused. They increase maintenance cost because every future bug fix must be found in multiple locations.
providers/opencode/request.py:11 qualitylegacy
low Legacy quality quality conf 0.86 Duplicated implementation block across source files
Duplicated blocks are a common artifact when generated code is pasted or recreated instead of reused. They increase maintenance cost because every future bug fix must be found in multiple locations.
messaging/rendering/telegram_markdown.py:35 qualitylegacy
low Legacy quality quality conf 0.86 Duplicated implementation block across source files
Duplicated blocks are a common artifact when generated code is pasted or recreated instead of reused. They increase maintenance cost because every future bug fix must be found in multiple locations.
messaging/platforms/telegram.py:71 qualitylegacy
{# ── 2026-05-17 Round 14: AI-agent bridge footer ────────────────────── Discoverability: the /agents/voting/ guide + MCP manifest exist but aren't linked from anywhere users actually land. Small, opt-in footer. #}
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