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Wrivard/Oryon

https://github.com/Wrivard/Oryon · scanned 2026-06-16 01:00 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

95 raw signals (0 security + 95 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 95 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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88.9% cov · 95 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 2 Medium 18 Low 15 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 95 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 25 Security 12 Cicd 2 Quality 56

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 56.7/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 1205 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 95 findings — concentrated in quality (56), frontend (25), security (12). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 2 high, 18 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 35 of 95 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'exec_used' in src/main/ipc/source.ipc.ts:64

Found a known-risky pattern (exec_used). Review and replace if possible.

src/main/ipc/source.ipc.ts:64 Exec used

high System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'exec_used' in src/main/services/orchestrator/merge-back.ts:25

Found a known-risky pattern (exec_used). Review and replace if possible.

src/main/services/orchestrator/merge-back.ts:25 Exec used

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/main/index.ts:324

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/main/services/groq-stt.ts:88

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/renderer/src/components/RightPanel/SourcePanel.tsx:37

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/release.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in docs-plans/PLAN-autoupdate.json:91

Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.

docs-plans/PLAN-autoupdate.json:91 Dangerous innerhtml

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/main/ipc/source.ipc.ts:2

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

src/main/ipc/source.ipc.ts:2 Node child process

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/main/services/audio-mute.ts:1

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

src/main/services/audio-mute.ts:1 Node child process

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/main/services/dev-server.ts:1

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

src/main/services/dev-server.ts:1 Node child process

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/main/services/orchestrator/cli.ts:1

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

src/main/services/orchestrator/cli.ts:1 Node child process

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/main/services/orchestrator/green-gate.ts:15

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

src/main/services/orchestrator/green-gate.ts:15 Node child process

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/main/services/orchestrator/merge-back.ts:9

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

src/main/services/orchestrator/merge-back.ts:9 Node child process

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/main/services/skills.ts:9

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

src/main/services/skills.ts:9 Node child process

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/main/services/text-injection.ts:2

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

src/main/services/text-injection.ts:2 Node child process

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/main/services/worktrees.ts:15

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

src/main/services/worktrees.ts:15 Node child process

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 42 placeholder/mock markers across 14 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio

6 test file(s) for 148 source file(s) (ratio 0.04). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.

Coverage

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 25 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected

No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 package.json defines install-time lifecycle scripts

preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare scripts execute during dependency installation. Review them carefully for network calls, obfuscation, shell execution, or credential access.

package.json CI/CD securitySupply chainNpm

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — src/main/db/index.ts:29