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digitie/pinvi

https://github.com/digitie/pinvi · scanned 2026-06-17 01:56 UTC (2 months, 3 weeks ago)

201 raw signals (0 security + 201 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 3 weeks ago · v2 · last Δ -31.3 (diff) · 178 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 23 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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100.0% cov · 178 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: severity: medium × excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 120 Medium 11 Low 35 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 178 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 12 Frontend 11 Hardware 4 Security 52 Cicd 3 Quality 27 Api 69

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 45.4/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 3005 nodes across 30 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 201 findings — concentrated in api (69), security (52), quality (40). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 120 high, 15 medium. Recommended next step: open the api layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 11 of 178 actionable findings. 201 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — packages/api-client/src/client.ts:7

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — packages/domain/src/upload.ts:44

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing lockfile. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: apps/api/Dockerfile

No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.

Container

medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: apps/web/Dockerfile

No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.

Container

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 5 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

docker/setup-qemu-action@v3 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

lines 51, 54, 57, 64, 77

.github/workflows/docker-images.yml:51, 54, 57, 64, 77 (5 hits)

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/docker-images.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in airbnb-marker-palette.html:532

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

airbnb-marker-palette.html:532 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — scripts/pr_review_monitor.py:45

`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 45 placeholder/mock markers across 24 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

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