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bod-ee/edge.libx.js

https://github.com/bod-ee/edge.libx.js · scanned 2026-06-17 01:41 UTC (1 month, 1 week ago)

30 raw signals (0 security + 30 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 month, 1 week ago · v2 · last Δ -31.6 (diff) · 30 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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66.7% cov · 30 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 1 High 3 Medium 10 Low 12 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 30 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 2 Security 7 Cicd 1 Quality 11 Api 9

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 45.1/100 with 66.7% coverage. It contains 116 nodes across 7 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 30 findings — concentrated in quality (11), api (9), security (7). Risk profile is high: 1 critical, 3 high, 10 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 26 of 30 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'private_key_in_repo' in src/helpers/jwt.ts:51

Found a known-risky pattern (private_key_in_repo). Review and replace if possible.

src/helpers/jwt.ts:51 Private key in repo

high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: POST https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token (src/helpers/jwt.ts:123)

`src/helpers/jwt.ts:123` calls `POST https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: axios Normalized path used for matching: `/https:/oauth2.googleapis.com/token` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https:/…

Dangling fetchAxios

high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: POST https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v4/token (src/helpers/jwt.ts:135)

`src/helpers/jwt.ts:135` calls `POST https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v4/token` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/https:/www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v4/token` If this points at an external API, prefix it…

Dangling fetchFetch

high System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'eval_used' in src/helpers/require.ts:301

Found a known-risky pattern (eval_used). Review and replace if possible.

src/helpers/require.ts:301 Eval used

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/helpers/EdgeNetwork.ts:35

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/helpers/jwt.ts:36

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/modules/MCPAuth.ts:370

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/settings.local.json

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

.claude/settings.local.json VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .mcp.json

.mcp.json VerificationMcp config

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in README.md:14

Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.

README.md:14 Cors wildcard

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in src/helpers/getExpress.ts:23

Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.

src/helpers/getExpress.ts:23 Cors wildcard

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in src/modules/cors.ts:26

Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.

src/modules/cors.ts:26 Cors wildcard

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in src/modules/RouterWrapper.ts:20

Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.

src/modules/RouterWrapper.ts:20 Cors wildcard

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/modules/MCPAuth.ts:364

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

src/modules/MCPAuth.ts:364 Direct innerhtml assignment

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 7 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/checkout@v3 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

.github/workflows/nodejs.yml:25 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Low test-to-source ratio

2 tests / 16 src (ratio 0.12).

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — examples/mcp-server.ts:172

Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak

Fq console leak

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — src/helpers/localServer.ts:83

Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak

Fq console leak

low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: ALL /mcp

`examples/mcp-server.ts` declares `ALL /mcp` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.

Unused endpoint

low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: DELETE /todos/:id

`examples/mcp-server.ts` declares `DELETE /todos/:id` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.

Unused endpoint

low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /search

`examples/mcp-server.ts` declares `GET /search` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.

Unused endpoint

low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /todos

`examples/mcp-server.ts` declares `GET /todos` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.

Unused endpoint

low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /todos/:id

`examples/mcp-server.ts` declares `GET /todos/:id` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.

Unused endpoint

low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /todos

`examples/mcp-server.ts` declares `POST /todos` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.

Unused endpoint

low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: PUT /todos/:id

`examples/mcp-server.ts` declares `PUT /todos/:id` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.

Unused endpoint

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