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rjohnt/concilium

https://github.com/rjohnt/concilium · scanned 2026-06-15 23:52 UTC (2 months, 3 weeks ago)

132 raw signals (83 security + 49 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 3 weeks ago · v1 · 58 actionable findings from 2 signal sources. 166 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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Combined
70.6
/100
Security checks
71
9 findings
System graph
71
100.0% cov · 49 findings
Critical
2
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Crowd
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Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 2 High 7 Medium 27 Low 7 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 9 System graph 49 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 33 Security 12 Api 1 Frontend 12
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 70.6/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 1354 nodes across 11 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 49 findings — concentrated in quality (25), frontend (12), security (11). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 3 high, 24 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 39 of 58 actionable findings. 224 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical Security checks quality Practices conf 0.82 15 occurrences Foundry mined mock as real or placeholder: rjohnt/concilium
Graph query export: Mock, sample, placeholder, or self-attested behavior treated as real Query id: mock_as_real_or_placeholder Query type: motif_query Intent: Hard negatives for fake completeness and missing real data paths. Motif: mock_as_real_or_placeholder Training usage: hard_negative Graph gol…
15 occurrences
repo-level (15 hits)
critical Security checks security auth conf 0.78 14 occurrences Foundry mined security auth guardrail gaps: rjohnt/concilium
Graph query export: Security/auth changes without enough guardrails Query id: security_auth_guardrail_gaps Query type: motif_query Intent: Assumption-check security/auth examples requiring stronger tests or CI. Motif: security_auth_without_guardrails Training usage: assumption_check Graph gold labe…
14 occurrences
repo-level (14 hits)
high Security checks quality Practices conf 0.84 12 occurrences Foundry mined bad chains: rjohnt/concilium
Comment chain pattern product: bad_chains Repo: rjohnt/concilium Thread: rjohnt/concilium#91 Outcome: claimed_resolved_unverified Thread label: thread_has_human_issue_and_fix_context Source graph label: source_backed_multi_signal_graph Reasons: source_graph_has_real_artifacts, source_graph_has_veri…
12 occurrences
repo-level (12 hits)
high Security checks quality Practices conf 0.80 Foundry mined docs only runtime fix: rjohnt/concilium
Graph query export: Docs-only response to runtime or integration issue Query id: docs_only_runtime_fix Query type: motif_query Intent: Assumption-check examples where docs or claims are not enough proof. Motif: docs_only_runtime_fix Training usage: assumption_check Graph gold label: supported_by_ve…
high Security checks quality Quality conf 0.76 6 occurrences Foundry mined schema ui api mismatch: rjohnt/concilium
Graph query export: Schema, UI, and API mismatch Query id: schema_ui_api_mismatch Query type: motif_query Intent: Assumption-check examples for data-path consistency across layers. Motif: schema_ui_api_mismatch Training usage: assumption_check Graph gold label: weak_supervision_needs_review Repo: r…
6 occurrences
repo-level (6 hits)
high Security checks quality Testing conf 0.78 15 occurrences Foundry mined test ci gap after feedback: rjohnt/concilium
Graph query export: Feedback exposes missing tests or CI Query id: test_ci_gap_after_feedback Query type: motif_query Intent: Hard negatives for feedback/fix chains without adequate guardrails. Motif: test_ci_gap_after_feedback Training usage: hard_negative Graph gold label: supported_by_verificati…
15 occurrences
repo-level (15 hits)
high System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'exec_used' in src/lib/sandbox/daytona-provider.ts:176
Found a known-risky pattern (exec_used). Review and replace if possible.
src/lib/sandbox/daytona-provider.ts:176 Exec used
high System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'exec_used' in src/lib/sandbox/docker-provider.ts:98
Found a known-risky pattern (exec_used). Review and replace if possible.
src/lib/sandbox/docker-provider.ts:98 Exec used
high System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'exec_used' in src/lib/sandbox/local-provider.ts:26
Found a known-risky pattern (exec_used). Review and replace if possible.
src/lib/sandbox/local-provider.ts:26 Exec used
medium Security checks quality Practices conf 0.62 49 occurrences Foundry mined assumption checks: rjohnt/concilium
Comment chain pattern product: assumption_checks Repo: rjohnt/concilium Thread: rjohnt/concilium#99 Outcome: claimed_resolved_unverified Thread label: thread_has_human_issue_and_fix_context Source graph label: source_backed_multi_signal_graph Reasons: source_graph_has_real_artifacts, source_graph_h…
49 occurrences
repo-level (49 hits)
medium Security checks quality maintenance conf 0.70 57 occurrences Foundry mined blueprint gap alignment: rjohnt/concilium
Graph query export: Human feedback aligned with blueprint or architecture gaps Query id: blueprint_gap_alignment Query type: motif_query Intent: Curriculum-gap examples connecting issue threads to helicopter-view gaps. Motif: blueprint_gap_alignment Training usage: curriculum_gap Graph gold label: …
57 occurrences
repo-level (57 hits)
medium Security checks quality Practices conf 0.70 6 occurrences Foundry mined unresolved feedback: rjohnt/concilium
Graph query export: Human feedback without linked fix evidence Query id: unresolved_feedback Query type: motif_query Intent: Negative/unresolved examples that should not be hallucinated into fixes. Motif: unlinked_feedback_needs_evidence Training usage: negative_or_unresolved Graph gold label: assu…
6 occurrences
repo-level (6 hits)
medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — src/components/__tests__/MarkdownPreview.test.tsx:16
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — src/components/BuildReportInline.tsx:207
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — src/components/MarkdownPreview.tsx:210
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — scripts/evals/record.ts:59
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/app/api/evals/route.ts:32
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/components/SessionPrompt.tsx:155
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/lib/__tests__/llm.test.ts:60
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/lib/__tests__/sanitize.test.ts:44
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/launch.json
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/launch.json VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in src/components/BuildReportInline.tsx:207
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
src/components/BuildReportInline.tsx:207 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in src/components/MarkdownPreview.tsx:210
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
src/components/MarkdownPreview.tsx:210 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in marketing/videos/gallery.html:97
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
marketing/videos/gallery.html:97 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/lib/sandbox/git-workspace.ts:10
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
src/lib/sandbox/git-workspace.ts:10 Node child process
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — get_token.py:32
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — scripts/create_trigger.py:35
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — scripts/gen_railway_token.py:31
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected
Found 66 placeholder/mock markers across 26 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.
Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Runtime service client appears to use placeholder configuration
A runtime source file appears to wire Supabase/Firebase/AI/payment-style clients to placeholder URLs, keys, or fallback values. In the Fable corpus this often means the UI/API shape is present while the backend service is not actually configured.
Runtime configService clientGenerated repo pattern
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 "active" state uses light bg in a dark theme — src/app/page.tsx:327
A ternary like `active ? 'bg-white' : '...'` (or bg-gray-100/200) on a dark theme produces jarring white pills. Use a dark-emphasized active state instead — border + ring or slightly brighter dark bg. Example: `active ? 'bg-gray-800 border-gray-500 ring-1 ring-blue-500/30' : '…'`. Why: P-E in CHEC…
Fq active light bg
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 23 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — scripts/screenshot-DEV-74.js:11
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — server.js:19
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: src/app/__tests__/acceptance-DEV-54.test.tsx (2092 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
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