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TeamMacLean/gbetter

https://github.com/TeamMacLean/gbetter · scanned 2026-06-16 00:30 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

37 raw signals (0 security + 37 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 28 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 9 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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66.7% cov · 28 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

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Severity: Critical 0 High 1 Medium 7 Low 12 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 28 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 11 Security 3 Cicd 4 Quality 10

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 72.8/100 with 66.7% coverage. It contains 682 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 37 findings — concentrated in cicd (13), frontend (11), quality (10). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 1 high, 7 medium. Recommended next step: open the cicd layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 20 of 28 actionable findings. 37 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'exec_used' in src/lib/services/queryRouter.ts:146

Found a known-risky pattern (exec_used). Review and replace if possible.

src/lib/services/queryRouter.ts:146 Exec used

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/lib/stores/remoteTracks.svelte.ts:372

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

codecov/codecov-action@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

.github/workflows/ci.yml:30 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/deploy.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'weak_hash' in src/lib/services/bam.ts:251

Found a known-risky pattern (weak_hash). Review and replace if possible.

src/lib/services/bam.ts:251 Weak hash

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — scripts/gene-tracks/convert_gffutils.py:73

`urllib.request.urlretrieve(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected

The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.

auth

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 21 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 10 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/checkout@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

2 files, 10 locations

.github/workflows/ci.yml:15, 18, 46, 54, 66, 69 (6 hits)

.github/workflows/deploy.yml:22, 25, 39, 52 (4 hits)

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 package.json defines install-time lifecycle scripts

preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare scripts execute during dependency installation. Review them carefully for network calls, obfuscation, shell execution, or credential access.

package.json CI/CD securitySupply chainNpm

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — tests/e2e/bam-quality-performance.test.ts:84