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Tsugiyama-cat/nw-monitor

https://github.com/Tsugiyama-cat/nw-monitor · scanned 2026-06-16 00:42 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

22 raw signals (0 security + 22 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 22 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
58.4
/100
Security checks
58
0 findings
System graph
58
88.9% cov · 22 findings
Critical
0
click to filter
Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 1 Medium 7 Low 12 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 22 Crowd 0 Layer: Hardware 7 Frontend 1 Security 2 Cicd 1 Quality 6 Api 5
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 58.4/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 44 nodes across 5 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 22 findings — concentrated in hardware (7), quality (6), api (5). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 1 high, 7 medium. Recommended next step: open the hardware layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 20 of 22 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `set_config` without auth dependency — webui/main.py:78
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
webui/main.py:78 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
medium System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap
Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, ci, tests. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: central-mcp/Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: poller/Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: webui/Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in webui/static/index.html:45
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
webui/static/index.html:45 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected
No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.
CI/CD securityCoverage
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
0 test file(s) for 2 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
Coverage
low System graph hardware Coverage conf 1.00 Containers defined but no K8s/orchestration manifest found
Repo has Dockerfiles/compose but no Kubernetes/Nomad manifests. If the target deployment is K8s, the manifests may live in a separate ops repo.
Deployment
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: node:22-slim
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
central-mcp/Dockerfile:1 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: python:3.12-slim
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
webui/Dockerfile:1 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: python:3.12-slim
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
poller/Dockerfile:1 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Near-duplicate function bodies in 2 places
Functions with the same first-5-line body hash: webui/main.py:load_env, poller/poller.py:load_env This is *the* AI-coder failure mode (4× more duplication in vibe-coded repos — see https://jw.hn/ai-code-hygiene). Consolidate or document why they're separate.
duplicatesduplication
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /
`webui/main.py` declares `GET /` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /api/config
`webui/main.py` declares `GET /api/config` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /api/fields
`webui/main.py` declares `GET /api/fields` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /api/status
`webui/main.py` declares `GET /api/status` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /api/config
`webui/main.py` declares `POST /api/config` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
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