Public scan — anyone with this URL can view this analysis. Sign up to track your own repos privately, run scheduled re-scans, and get AI fix prompts via your dashboard.
Sign up free Scan another repo

alpha112233/alphago_publisher

https://github.com/alpha112233/alphago_publisher · scanned 2026-06-17 01:32 UTC (1 month, 2 weeks ago)

41 raw signals (0 security + 41 graph)

File as issue Image
UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 month, 2 weeks ago · v2 · last Δ -8.2 (diff) · 40 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 1 repeated signal grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
68.5
/100
Security checks
69
0 findings
System graph
69
88.9% cov · 40 findings
Critical
0
click to filter
Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 2 Medium 8 Low 18 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 40 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 6 Frontend 4 Hardware 2 Quality 26 Security 2
Corpus Intelligence Cross-corpus context (cohort percentile, top patterns, fix plan) is shown only on repositories you own. Sign up and connect your repo to view it.
Scan summary Repository scanned at 68.5/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 813 nodes across 30 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 41 findings — concentrated in quality (27), software (6), frontend (4). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 2 high, 8 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 28 of 40 actionable findings. 41 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security auth conf 1.00 JS PATCH `/api/admin/infrastructure/servers/${encodeURIComponent(id)}` admin endpoint without auth — frontend/src/api/infrastructure.ts:107
Admin-scoped JS route with no recognizable auth: no middleware-position guard, no router-level guard above it in this file, and no inline permission call within the first 15 lines of the handler. If auth is applied where this router is mounted, dismiss with reason `by_design` or tag the route `// p…
frontend/src/api/infrastructure.ts:107 securityAuth js admin unauth
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 JS POST `/api/admin/infrastructure/servers` admin endpoint without auth — frontend/src/api/infrastructure.ts:132
Admin-scoped JS route with no recognizable auth: no middleware-position guard, no router-level guard above it in this file, and no inline permission call within the first 15 lines of the handler. If auth is applied where this router is mounted, dismiss with reason `by_design` or tag the route `// p…
frontend/src/api/infrastructure.ts:132 securityAuth js admin unauth
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — frontend/src/pages/PromoCodes.tsx:115
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: CLAUDE.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
CLAUDE.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license, ci, lockfile. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap
Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, ci, lockfile. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — blueprints/docs.py:232
`requests.post(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected
Found 47 placeholder/mock markers across 10 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.
Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
1 test file(s) for 65 source file(s) (ratio 0.02). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
Coverage
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 12 env vars used in code but missing from .env.example
Drift between code and config docs. The first few: `DISABLE_RECONCILE_CRON`, `FLASK_DEBUG`, `HSOL_MONGO_DB`, `HSOL_MONGO_URI`, `HSOL_OWNER_ADMIN_EMAIL`, `MONGO_URI`, `PROBE_ALLOWED_ORIGIN_SUFFIXES`, `PROVISIONER_SHARED_SECRET` + 4 more. Add them (with a placeholder/comment) to .env.example so onboa…
config drift
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 5 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: node:20-bullseye-slim
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
Dockerfile:2 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: python:3.12-slim-bullseye
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
Dockerfile:8 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Icon-only button without accessible name — frontend/src/pages/SuperAdmin.tsx:241
A `<button>` whose only child is a single glyph or symbol needs `title=` or `aria-label=` so screen readers (and tooltips on hover) work. Why: P3 in CHECKLIST.md — icon-only buttons skipped a title. Rule id: fq.button.no-label
Fq button no label
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 2 occurrences Near-duplicate function bodies in 2 places
Functions with the same first-5-line body hash: blueprints/auth.py:wrapper, blueprints/auth.py:wrapper This is *the* AI-coder failure mode (4× more duplication in vibe-coded repos — see https://jw.hn/ai-code-hygiene). Consolidate or document why they're separate.
2 occurrences
repo-level (2 hits)
duplicatesduplication
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Near-duplicate function bodies in 3 places
Functions with the same first-5-line body hash: database/positions_db.py:query_aggregates_for_admin, database/positions_db.py:query_by_subscriber_for_admin, database/positions_db.py:query_broker_only_for_admin This is *the* AI-coder failure mode (4× more duplication in vibe-coded repos — see https…
duplicatesduplication
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality dependencies conf 1.00 Node manifest has dependencies but no lockfile: frontend/package.json
`package.json` declares dependencies, but no same-directory npm/pnpm/yarn/bun lockfile was found. Generated projects without lockfiles are less reproducible and harder to secure-scan precisely.
frontend/package.json LockfileReproducibilityGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Old/deprecated-named symbol `alphago_publisher_v1` in utils/crypto.py:34
Names with suffixes like `_old`, `_v1`, `_deprecated` usually indicate replaced-but-not-removed code (typical AI-coder leftover). Confirm and delete, or rename if it's the active version.
old markerDead code
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: list_aggregate_for_admin
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
database/positions_db.py:162
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: list_all_periods_for_admin
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
database/metering_db.py:67
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: lookup_by_api_key
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
database/api_creds_db.py:30
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: mark_exited
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
database/signals_db.py:74
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: reconcile_all_admins
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
services/reconcile.py:111
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: smtp_configured
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
services/email.py:37
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — frontend/src/pages/SendSignal.tsx:727
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: frontend/src/pages/Positions.tsx (1509 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.
For AI agents + API integrations
Email me when this repo regresses
Free. We re-scan periodically; new criticals → your inbox. No signup required for the scan itself.
API access

This page is publicly accessible at: https://repobility.com/scan/e20ffb4d-fc92-4977-8d85-308c676f0ad5/

To check status programmatically (no auth required): 

curl -s https://repobility.com/api/v1/public/scan/e20ffb4d-fc92-4977-8d85-308c676f0ad5/

Important — please don't re-submit the same URL repeatedly. The submission endpoint is idempotent: re-submitting the same git URL returns this same scan_token, not a new one. To re-scan this repo, sign up free and use the dashboard.