Julia-Tempering/Pigeons.jl

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26 of your 28 findings came from Repobility's proprietary detections. ✓ Repobility tags below mark them.

https://github.com/Julia-Tempering/Pigeons.jl · scanned 2026-06-05 19:28 UTC (4 days, 15 hours ago) · 10 languages

45 raw signals (27 security + 18 graph) 11/13 scanners ran 91st percentile · Unknown · System graph score 85 (lower by 11)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 4 days, 15 hours ago · v2 · 9 actionable findings from 2 signal sources. 27 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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55.6% cov · 4 findings

Score breakdown â 2026-05-18-v5

Component	Sub-score	Weight	Contribution
`structure_score`	45.0	0.15	6.75
`security_score`	100.0	0.25	25.00
`testing_score`	70.0	0.20	14.00
`documentation_score`	60.0	0.15	9.00
`practices_score`	75.0	0.15	11.25
`code_quality`	80.0	0.10	8.00
Overall		1.00	74.0

security_score may be inflated — optional security scanners were skipped on this fast scan

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 1 Medium 4 Low 2 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 5 System graph 4 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 1 Cicd 5 Api 1 Frontend 1 Security 1

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

Scan summary Quality grade B (74/100). Dimensions: security 100, maintainability 45. 27 findings (26 security).

Showing 7 of 9 actionable findings. 36 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

low Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.35 ✓ Repobility Workflow references repository secrets in a pull_request workflow

Fork pull_request runs do not receive normal repository secrets on GitHub Actions. Review this as a reliability/intent signal, not as direct fork-secret exfiltration. Raise severity only for pull_request_target or another trusted-context path that runs untrusted PR code with secrets.

.github/workflows/CI.yml:51 CI/CD securityworkflow secretsGitHub Actions

medium Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility 18 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

[MINED115] Action `julia-actions/setup-julia` pinned to mutable ref `@v2`: `uses: julia-actions/setup-julia@v2` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect ~23K repos. Pin to a 40-ch…

4 files, 18 locations

.github/workflows/CI.yml:42, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 79, 82, +6 more (14 hits)

.github/workflows/github-repo-stats.yml:17 (2 hits)

.github/workflows/CompatHelper.yml:18

.github/workflows/TagBot.yml:12

CI/CD securitySupply chainGitHub Actions

low Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility 9 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

[MINED115] Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v5`: `uses: actions/checkout@v5` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect ~23K repos. Pin to a 40-char commit SHA + lo…

lines 37, 38, 74, 75, 116, 130, 163, 164

.github/workflows/CI.yml:37, 38, 74, 75, 116, 130, 163, 164 (9 hits)

CI/CD securitySupply chainGitHub Actions

high Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

[MINED115] Action `julia-actions/RegisterAction` pinned to mutable ref `@latest`: `uses: julia-actions/RegisterAction@latest` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect ~23K repos. …

.github/workflows/register.yml:14 CI/CD securitySupply chainGitHub Actions

medium Security checks quality Practices conf 1.00 [CFG006] Missing .gitignore: No .gitignore file. Risk of committing secrets and build artifacts.

Add a .gitignore appropriate for your language/framework.

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 3 occurrences GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

3 files, 3 locations

.github/workflows/CI.yml

.github/workflows/CompatHelper.yml

.github/workflows/register.yml

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected

The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). Either auth lives in custom code, in a separate service, or is missing.

auth

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