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akurilin/pystack

https://github.com/akurilin/pystack · scanned 2026-06-17 01:30 UTC (1 month, 2 weeks ago)

14 raw signals (0 security + 14 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 month, 2 weeks ago · v2 · last Δ +6.6 (diff) · 12 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 2 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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88.9% cov · 12 findings

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Severity: Critical 0 High 4 Medium 3 Low 3 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 12 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 2 Security 5 Cicd 2 Quality 3

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 83.3/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 208 nodes across 6 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 14 findings — concentrated in security (5), cicd (4), quality (3). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 4 high, 3 medium. Recommended next step: open the security layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 10 of 12 actionable findings. 14 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI DELETE `delete_task` without auth dependency — backend/src/pystack_api/api/routes/tasks.py:44

`@router.delete` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.

backend/src/pystack_api/api/routes/tasks.py:44 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation

high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI PATCH `update_task` without auth dependency — backend/src/pystack_api/api/routes/tasks.py:28

`@router.patch` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.

backend/src/pystack_api/api/routes/tasks.py:28 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation

high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `create_task` without auth dependency — backend/src/pystack_api/api/routes/tasks.py:18

`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.

backend/src/pystack_api/api/routes/tasks.py:18 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation

high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `move_task` without auth dependency — backend/src/pystack_api/api/routes/tasks.py:36

`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.

backend/src/pystack_api/api/routes/tasks.py:36 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

astral-sh/setup-uv@v8 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

.github/workflows/ci.yml:29 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected

The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.

auth

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 3 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/checkout@v6 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

lines 24, 34, 41

.github/workflows/ci.yml:24, 34, 41 (3 hits)

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Low test-to-source ratio

6 tests / 38 src (ratio 0.16).

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Old/deprecated-named symbol `model_copy` in backend/tests/conftest.py:25

Names with suffixes like `_old`, `_v1`, `_deprecated` usually indicate replaced-but-not-removed code (typical AI-coder leftover). Confirm and delete, or rename if it's the active version.

old markerDead code

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