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trinity-aml/TorrServer-LT

https://github.com/trinity-aml/TorrServer-LT · scanned 2026-06-16 00:41 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

49 raw signals (0 security + 49 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 38 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 11 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
57.0
/100
Security checks
57
0 findings
System graph
57
88.9% cov · 38 findings
Critical
2
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 2 High 1 Medium 23 Low 9 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 38 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 2 Hardware 10 Security 6 Cicd 3 Quality 15 Api 2
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 57.0/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 933 nodes across 7 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 49 findings — concentrated in quality (15), cicd (11), hardware (10). Risk profile is high: 5 critical, 1 high, 24 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 35 of 38 actionable findings. 49 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 4 occurrences Possible secret in installTorrServerMac.sh
Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.
lines 107, 113, 168, 174
installTorrServerMac.sh:107, 113, 168, 174 (4 hits)
critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in web/public/index.html
Detected pattern matching generic_api_key. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.
web/public/index.html:56
high System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'eval_used' in web/public/lordicon/lord-icon-2.0.2.js:1
Found a known-risky pattern (eval_used). Review and replace if possible.
web/public/lordicon/lord-icon-2.0.2.js:1 Eval used
medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — server/web/pages/template/pages/static/js/2.c1f7efe5.chunk.js:2
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — web/src/components/Donate/DonateDialog.jsx:34
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — server/web/pages/template/pages/lordicon/lord-icon-2.0.2.js:1
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — server/web/pages/template/pages/static/js/2.c1f7efe5.chunk.js:2
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — server/web/pages/template/pages/static/js/main.03d691da.chunk.js:1
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — web/public/lordicon/lord-icon-2.0.2.js:1
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — web/src/components/CloseServer.jsx:51
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — web/src/components/DialogTorrentDetailsContent/Table/index.jsx:23
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — web/src/components/RemoveAll.jsx:13
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 CI is configured but no tests are detected
A CI pipeline exists, but the scan found no test files to gate. Opus labeled this generated-code pattern as config theater: release machinery exists, but it has little behavioral signal.
CI/CDConfig theaterRepo hardening
medium System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image uses a mutable or implicit tag: alpine
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
Dockerfile:61 containersPinned dependencies
medium System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image uses a mutable or implicit tag: alpine
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
docker/Dockerfile:1 containersPinned dependencies
medium System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image uses a mutable or implicit tag: ubuntu
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
Dockerfile:47 containersPinned dependencies
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: docker/Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: docker/lite/Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 2 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
docker/setup-buildx-action@v3 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
2 files, 2 locations
.github/workflows/test-install-script.yml:74
.github/workflows/ts_release.yml:42
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/ts_release.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in web/src/components/Donate/DonateDialog.jsx:34
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
web/src/components/Donate/DonateDialog.jsx:34 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in web/public/lordicon/lord-icon-2.0.2.js:1
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
web/public/lordicon/lord-icon-2.0.2.js:1 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.
auth
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected
Found 18 placeholder/mock markers across 8 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.
Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
17 test file(s) for 240 source file(s) (ratio 0.07). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
Coverage
low System graph hardware Coverage conf 1.00 Containers defined but no K8s/orchestration manifest found
Repo has Dockerfiles/compose but no Kubernetes/Nomad manifests. If the target deployment is K8s, the manifests may live in a separate ops repo.
Deployment
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: debian:bookworm-slim
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
docker/lite/Dockerfile:1 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: golang:1.26.3-alpine
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
Dockerfile:24 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: node:16-alpine
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
Dockerfile:2 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 8 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/setup-go@v5 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
4 files, 8 locations
.github/workflows/build.yml:28, 55, 63, 69 (4 hits)
.github/workflows/test-install-script.yml:33, 71 (2 hits)
.github/workflows/build-macos.yml:76
.github/workflows/ts_release.yml:33
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET
`server/web/pages/template/pages/static/js/main.03d691da.chunk.js` declares `GET ` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes…
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST
`server/web/pages/template/pages/static/js/main.03d691da.chunk.js` declares `POST ` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consume…
Unused endpoint
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: installTorrServerLinux.sh (2128 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
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