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1bananachicken/MaaNTE

https://github.com/1bananachicken/MaaNTE · scanned 2026-05-17 01:36 UTC (18 hours, 51 minutes ago) · 10 languages

83 findings (9 legacy + 74 scanner) 37th percentile · Python · small (2-20K LoC) Scanner says 86 (lower by 22)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 18 hours, 50 minutes ago · v2 · 46 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
Combined
82.5
/100
Repobility
79
9 legacy
9-layer
86
88.9% cov · 37 gaps
Critical
0
click to filter
Agents
6
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
{# ── 2026-05-17 R27 #5: score breakdown panel ────────────────────── Surfaces the score_breakdown JSON that's been silently stored on Repository for months. Turns hidden math into a trust signal. #}
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: severity: medium × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 5 Medium 15 Low 23 Source: Legacy 9 9-layer 37 Crowd 0 Layer: Security 2 Software 14 Quality 19 Api 1 Network 1 Frontend 1 Cicd 8
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 86.0/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 546 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 37 findings — concentrated in quality (13), software (12), cicd (8). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 12 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 15 of 46 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium Legacy security path_traversal conf 1.00 [SEC012] ZipSlip — Archive Path Traversal: Archive extraction without path validation allows writing files outside the target directory.
Validate extracted paths with os.path.realpath() and ensure they stay within the target directory.
tools/ci/setup_embed_python.py:50 path_traversallegacy
medium Legacy software log_injection conf 1.00 [SEC034] Log Injection / Log Forging — unsanitized user input in log: User input is logged without sanitizing newlines or control characters. Attackers inject `\n` to forge fake log entries, hide tracks, or exploit downstream log parsers (SIEM, splunk). Combined with template injection this can escalate to RCE (CVE-2021-44228 log4shell). CWE-117.
Strip control characters before logging: safe = user_input.replace('\n','').replace('\r','').replace('\x00','') logger.info('User action: %s', safe) Always use parameterized logging (`%s` + args), never f-strings or string concat — that's also what mitigates log4shell-style attacks. For structu…
agent/main.py:307 log_injectionlegacy
medium Legacy quality quality conf 0.82 Parallel implementation file sits beside a canonical file
AI-assisted edits often create a new sibling file instead of integrating the change into the existing module. That leaves two paths for future maintainers to understand and can hide the code that is actually wired into the app.
agent/custom/action/AutoFish/auto_fish_new.py:1 qualitylegacy
medium 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
robinraju/release-downloader@v1 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/install.yml:100 supply-chaingithub-actionspinned-dependencies
medium 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
robinraju/release-downloader@v1 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/install.yml:110 supply-chaingithub-actionspinned-dependencies
medium 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
orhun/git-cliff-action@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/install.yml:210 supply-chaingithub-actionspinned-dependencies
medium 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
MirrorChyan/release-note-action@v1 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/mirrorchyan_release_note.yml:19 supply-chaingithub-actionspinned-dependencies
medium 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/sync_schema_files.yml supply-chaingithub-actionsleast-privilege
medium 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/install.yml supply-chaingithub-actionsleast-privilege
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — agent/main.py:141
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — build.py:70
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — tools/ci/download_deps.py:100
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer security coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). Either auth lives in custom code, in a separate service, or is missing.
coverageauth
medium 9-layer network security conf 1.00 Privileged port 10 in use
Port 10 is privileged (<1024). Make sure the service runs with the right caps or front it with a non-privileged port via a load balancer.
.github/workflows/sync_schema_files.yml securityports
medium 9-layer quality tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
0 test file(s) for 59 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
testscoverage
{# ── 2026-05-17 Round 14: AI-agent bridge footer ────────────────────── Discoverability: the /agents/voting/ guide + MCP manifest exist but aren't linked from anywhere users actually land. Small, opt-in footer. #}
For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.
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