Public scan — anyone with this URL can view this analysis. Sign up to track your own repos privately, run scheduled re-scans, and get AI fix prompts via your dashboard.

1bananachicken/MaaNTE

https://github.com/1bananachicken/MaaNTE · scanned 2026-05-17 01:36 UTC (14 hours, 46 minutes ago) · 10 languages

83 findings (9 legacy + 74 scanner) 37th percentile · Python · small (2-20K LoC) Scanner says 86 (lower by 22)

UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 14 hours, 45 minutes ago · v2 · 46 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: source: legacy × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 5 Medium 15 Low 23 Source: Legacy 9 9-layer 37 Crowd 0 Layer: Security 2 Software 14 Quality 19 Api 1 Network 1 Frontend 1 Cicd 8
Corpus Intelligence Cross-corpus context (cohort percentile, top patterns, fix plan) is shown only on repositories you own. Sign up and connect your repo to view it.
Scan summary Repository scanned at 86.0/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 546 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 37 findings — concentrated in quality (13), software (12), cicd (8). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 12 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 9 of 46 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
tools/ci/setup_embed_python.py:32 ssrflegacy
high Legacy quality testing No test files found
Add a test directory (tests/ or __tests__/) with unit tests for core functionality. Use pytest (Python), Jest (JS/TS), or go test (Go). Start with tests for critical business logic and security-sensitive functions.
testinglegacy
high Legacy quality error_handling conf 1.00 [ERR001] Silent Exception Swallowing: Silently swallowing all exceptions hides bugs. Even in cleanup code, log at DEBUG level.
Log the error: `except Exception: logger.debug('cleanup failed', exc_info=True)`. Or handle specific exception types.
agent/custom/action/auto_make_coffee.py:80 error_handlinglegacy
high Legacy quality error_handling conf 1.00 [ERR001] Silent Exception Swallowing: Silently swallowing all exceptions hides bugs. Even in cleanup code, log at DEBUG level.
Log the error: `except Exception: logger.debug('cleanup failed', exc_info=True)`. Or handle specific exception types.
agent/custom/action/AutoFish/auto_fish.py:51 error_handlinglegacy
high Legacy quality error_handling conf 1.00 [ERR001] Silent Exception Swallowing: Silently swallowing all exceptions hides bugs. Even in cleanup code, log at DEBUG level.
Log the error: `except Exception: logger.debug('cleanup failed', exc_info=True)`. Or handle specific exception types.
agent/custom/action/AutoFish/auto_buy_fish_bait.py:51 error_handlinglegacy
medium Legacy security path_traversal conf 1.00 [SEC012] ZipSlip — Archive Path Traversal: Archive extraction without path validation allows writing files outside the target directory.
Validate extracted paths with os.path.realpath() and ensure they stay within the target directory.
tools/ci/setup_embed_python.py:50 path_traversallegacy
medium Legacy software log_injection conf 1.00 [SEC034] Log Injection / Log Forging — unsanitized user input in log: User input is logged without sanitizing newlines or control characters. Attackers inject `\n` to forge fake log entries, hide tracks, or exploit downstream log parsers (SIEM, splunk). Combined with template injection this can escalate to RCE (CVE-2021-44228 log4shell). CWE-117.
Strip control characters before logging: safe = user_input.replace('\n','').replace('\r','').replace('\x00','') logger.info('User action: %s', safe) Always use parameterized logging (`%s` + args), never f-strings or string concat — that's also what mitigates log4shell-style attacks. For structu…
agent/main.py:307 log_injectionlegacy
medium Legacy quality quality conf 0.82 Parallel implementation file sits beside a canonical file
AI-assisted edits often create a new sibling file instead of integrating the change into the existing module. That leaves two paths for future maintainers to understand and can hide the code that is actually wired into the app.
agent/custom/action/AutoFish/auto_fish_new.py:1 qualitylegacy
low Legacy quality quality conf 0.86 Duplicated implementation block across source files
Duplicated blocks are a common artifact when generated code is pasted or recreated instead of reused. They increase maintenance cost because every future bug fix must be found in multiple locations.
agent/custom/action/AutoFish/auto_fish.py:148 qualitylegacy
{# ── 2026-05-17 Round 14: AI-agent bridge footer ────────────────────── Discoverability: the /agents/voting/ guide + MCP manifest exist but aren't linked from anywhere users actually land. Small, opt-in footer. #}
For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.
For AI agents + API integrations
Email me when this repo regresses
Free. We re-scan periodically; new criticals → your inbox. No signup required for the scan itself.
API access

This page is publicly accessible at: https://repobility.com/scan/e578378a-c3f4-4dc2-a070-196e3fdb9e07/

To check status programmatically (no auth required):

curl -s https://repobility.com/api/v1/public/scan/e578378a-c3f4-4dc2-a070-196e3fdb9e07/

Important — please don't re-submit the same URL repeatedly. The submission endpoint is idempotent: re-submitting the same git URL returns this same scan_token, not a new one. To re-scan this repo, sign up free and use the dashboard.