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dodo-reach/hermes-desktop

https://github.com/dodo-reach/hermes-desktop · scanned 2026-05-17 01:36 UTC (15 hours, 48 minutes ago) · 10 languages

27 findings (7 legacy + 20 scanner) Scanner says 86 (lower by 18)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 15 hours, 47 minutes ago · v2 · 17 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
Combined
78.0
/100
Repobility
70
7 legacy
9-layer
86
55.6% cov · 10 gaps
Critical
0
click to filter
Agents
6
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: source: legacy × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 6 Medium 2 Low 7 Source: Legacy 7 9-layer 10 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 1 Software 3 Security 4 Api 1 Frontend 1 Cicd 7
Scan summary Repository scanned at 86.2/100 with 55.6% coverage. It contains 224 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 10 findings — concentrated in cicd (7), api (1), frontend (1). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium. Recommended next step: open the cicd layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 7 of 17 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Legacy security injection conf 1.00 [SEC004] SQL Injection Risk: String interpolation in SQL execution. Allows SQL injection.
Use parameterized queries: connection.execute('SELECT * FROM t WHERE id = ?', [id]). For dynamic table or column names, choose identifiers from a hard-coded allowlist and keep values in parameters.
Sources/HermesDesktop/Services/UsageBrowserService.swift:215 injectionlegacy
high Legacy security injection conf 0.85 [SEC004] SQL Injection Risk: String interpolation in SQL execution. Allows SQL injection.
Use parameterized queries: cursor.execute('SELECT * FROM t WHERE id = ?', [id]). For dynamic table or column names, choose identifiers from a hard-coded allowlist and keep values in parameters.
Sources/HermesDesktop/Services/SessionBrowserService.swift:630 injectionlegacy
high Legacy security injection conf 1.00 [SEC004] SQL Injection Risk: String interpolation in SQL execution. Allows SQL injection.
Use parameterized queries: conn.execute('SELECT * FROM t WHERE id = ?', [id]). For dynamic table or column names, choose identifiers from a hard-coded allowlist and keep values in parameters.
Sources/HermesDesktop/Services/KanbanBrowserService.swift:1960 injectionlegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
Sources/HermesDesktop/Services/UpdateCheckService.swift:4 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
Sources/HermesDesktop/Services/Storage/AppPaths.swift:18 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
Sources/HermesDesktop/Services/SSH/SSHTransport.swift:74 ssrflegacy
low Legacy quality quality conf 0.86 Duplicated implementation block across source files
Duplicated blocks are a common artifact when generated code is pasted or recreated instead of reused. They increase maintenance cost because every future bug fix must be found in multiple locations.
Sources/HermesDesktop/Services/SkillBrowserService.swift:131 qualitylegacy
{# ── 2026-05-17 Round 14: AI-agent bridge footer ────────────────────── Discoverability: the /agents/voting/ guide + MCP manifest exist but aren't linked from anywhere users actually land. Small, opt-in footer. #}
For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.
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