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colbymchenry/codegraph

https://github.com/colbymchenry/codegraph.git · scanned 2026-05-16 19:36 UTC (23 hours, 48 minutes ago) · 10 languages

132 findings (22 legacy + 110 scanner) 76th percentile · Typescript · medium (20-100K LoC) Scanner says 76 (higher by 5)

UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 23 hours, 48 minutes ago · v2 · 77 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

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Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: severity: high × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 3 Medium 6 Low 54 Source: Legacy 22 9-layer 55 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 39 Software 21 Frontend 12 Security 2 Cicd 1 Api 2
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 76.1/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 709 nodes across 2 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 55 findings — concentrated in software (20), quality (18), frontend (12). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 2 high, 4 medium. Recommended next step: open the software layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 3 of 77 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
src/mcp/index.ts:30 ssrflegacy 1 TP · 1 FP
high 9-layer api wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: GET /api/data (__tests__/extraction.test.ts:300)
`__tests__/extraction.test.ts:300` calls `GET /api/data` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/data` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher skips it.
wiringdangling-fetchfetch
high 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'exec_used' in src/db/sqlite-adapter.ts:16
Found a known-risky pattern (exec_used). Review and replace if possible.
src/db/sqlite-adapter.ts:16 owaspexec_used
{# ── 2026-05-17 Round 14: AI-agent bridge footer ────────────────────── Discoverability: the /agents/voting/ guide + MCP manifest exist but aren't linked from anywhere users actually land. Small, opt-in footer. #}
For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.
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