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Issue title

Action `actions/setup-java` pinned to mutable ref `@v5`

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Pick exactly which findings appear in the issue body. By default the top 5 are included. Uncheck noise, check what matters.

Top 5 (default)
Severity Rule Title File:line
HIGH SEC085 [SEC085] JS: child_process.exec with non-literal: child_process.exec with user-derived in… build.gradle.kts:197
HIGH MINED134 Binary file `gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.jar` committed in source repo gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.jar:1
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/upload-artifact` pinned to mutable ref `@v7` .github/workflows/gradle.yaml:184
HIGH MINED115 Action `gradle/actions/setup-gradle` pinned to mutable ref `@v6` .github/workflows/gradle.yaml:171
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/setup-java` pinned to mutable ref `@v5` .github/workflows/gradle.yaml:159
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v6` .github/workflows/gradle.yaml:158
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/upload-artifact` pinned to mutable ref `@v7` .github/workflows/gradle.yaml:144
HIGH MINED115 Action `gradle/actions/setup-gradle` pinned to mutable ref `@v6` .github/workflows/gradle.yaml:131
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/setup-java` pinned to mutable ref `@v5` .github/workflows/gradle.yaml:119
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v6` .github/workflows/gradle.yaml:118
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/upload-artifact` pinned to mutable ref `@v7` .github/workflows/gradle.yaml:103
HIGH MINED115 Action `gradle/actions/setup-gradle` pinned to mutable ref `@v6` .github/workflows/gradle.yaml:90
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/setup-java` pinned to mutable ref `@v5` .github/workflows/gradle.yaml:78
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v6` .github/workflows/gradle.yaml:77
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/upload-artifact` pinned to mutable ref `@v7` .github/workflows/gradle.yaml:63
HIGH MINED115 Action `gradle/actions/setup-gradle` pinned to mutable ref `@v6` .github/workflows/gradle.yaml:50
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/setup-java` pinned to mutable ref `@v5` .github/workflows/gradle.yaml:45
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v6` .github/workflows/gradle.yaml:44
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/upload-artifact` pinned to mutable ref `@v7` .github/workflows/gradle.yaml:36
HIGH MINED115 Action `gradle/actions/setup-gradle` pinned to mutable ref `@v6` .github/workflows/gradle.yaml:23
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/setup-java` pinned to mutable ref `@v5` .github/workflows/gradle.yaml:18
HIGH MINED115 Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v6` .github/workflows/gradle.yaml:17
MED SEC045 [SEC045] eval()/exec() on stored or user-supplied data: eval() and exec() on data — even … build.gradle.kts:197
LOW AIC003 Duplicated implementation block across source files src/integrationTest/java/net/ltgt/gradl…:22
LOW AIC003 Duplicated implementation block across source files src/integrationTest/java/net/ltgt/gradl…:84
LOW AIC003 Duplicated implementation block across source files src/integrationTest/java/net/ltgt/gradl…:100
Reset to top 5 26 findings available (after auto-suppression of test files + won't-fix)

Issue body (markdown)

## Code-quality scan: `tbroyer/gradle-errorprone-plugin`

**Score: 86/100 (B)**  ·  26 findings  ·  scanned 2026-06-05 22:07 UTC  ·  3,092 LOC

| Severity | Count |
|---|---|
| CRITICAL | 0 |
| HIGH | 22 |
| MEDIUM | 1 |
| LOW | 3 |

📊 [Full filterable report](https://repobility.com/scan/ef79bea5-587a-4d4d-b341-f8a407dd1c67/)  ·  ![scorecard](https://repobility.com/scan/ef79bea5-587a-4d4d-b341-f8a407dd1c67/report.png?v=1780697276-s2)

### Top findings

1. **HIGH** `SEC085` — JS: child_process.exec with non-literal
   `build.gradle.kts:197`
2. **HIGH** `MINED134` — Binary file `gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.jar` committed in source repo
   `gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.jar:1` · ✓ Repobility
3. **HIGH** `MINED115` — Action `actions/upload-artifact` pinned to mutable ref `@v7`
   `.github/workflows/gradle.yaml:184` · ✓ Repobility
4. **HIGH** `MINED115` — Action `gradle/actions/setup-gradle` pinned to mutable ref `@v6`
   `.github/workflows/gradle.yaml:171` · ✓ Repobility
5. **HIGH** `MINED115` — Action `actions/setup-java` pinned to mutable ref `@v5`
   `.github/workflows/gradle.yaml:159` · ✓ Repobility

---

**Security note**: this issue is public. If any flagged finding is a real, exploitable vulnerability, please redirect to your `SECURITY.md` policy or open a [private security advisory](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/security-advisories/guidance-on-reporting-and-writing-information-about-vulnerabilities/privately-reporting-a-security-vulnerability) instead. We're happy to close this and re-submit privately.

---

_Filed automatically. Close this issue if not useful — we won't refile. Full report: https://repobility.com/scan/ef79bea5-587a-4d4d-b341-f8a407dd1c67/_
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23/26 findings (88%) on this scan are already flagged as test-file, won't-fix, or suppressed. The scan is too noisy to file as a single issue. Curate down to specific actionable findings, or address the FP source first.
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