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Singuralitylabs/portal-site

https://github.com/Singuralitylabs/portal-site · scanned 2026-06-16 00:13 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

37 raw signals (0 security + 37 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 20 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 17 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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88.9% cov · 20 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 10 Low 7 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 20 Crowd 0 Layer: Api 1 Frontend 4 Security 2 Cicd 2 Quality 11

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 65.1/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 612 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 37 findings — concentrated in cicd (19), quality (11), frontend (4). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 10 medium. Recommended next step: open the cicd layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 17 of 20 actionable findings. 37 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — app/(authenticated)/calendar/components/EventDetailModal.tsx:105

Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html

Fq dangerous html

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/(authenticated)/calendar/components/CalendarView.tsx:127

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/api/notifications/slack/route.ts:44

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/create-release.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in app/(authenticated)/calendar/components/EventDetailModal.tsx:105

Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.

app/(authenticated)/calendar/components/EventDetailModal.tsx:105 Dangerous innerhtml

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/db-types.cjs:3

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

scripts/db-types.cjs:3 Node child process

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 16 placeholder/mock markers across 5 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio

8 test file(s) for 108 source file(s) (ratio 0.07). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.

Coverage

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 5 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 18 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/checkout@v5 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

9 files, 18 locations

.github/workflows/release-pr.yml:56, 61, 94 (3 hits)

.github/workflows/build.yml:22, 25 (2 hits)

.github/workflows/check_console_log.yml:24, 27 (2 hits)

.github/workflows/create-release.yml:76, 184 (2 hits)

.github/workflows/db-types.yml:39, 43 (2 hits)

.github/workflows/format-check.yml:22, 25 (2 hits)

.github/workflows/test.yml:27, 31 (2 hits)

.github/workflows/typecheck.yml:33, 36 (2 hits)

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Icon-only button without accessible name — app/(authenticated)/calendar/components/EventDetailModal.tsx:84

A `<button>` whose only child is a single glyph or symbol needs `title=` or `aria-label=` so screen readers (and tooltips on hover) work. Why: P3 in CHECKLIST.md — icon-only buttons skipped a title. Rule id: fq.button.no-label

Fq button no label

low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected

No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — app/(auth)/callback/route.ts:32

Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak

Fq console leak

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — app/providers/supabase-auth-provider.tsx:109

Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak

Fq console leak

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