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dbower44022/cbm-client-intake

https://github.com/dbower44022/cbm-client-intake · scanned 2026-06-17 01:53 UTC (1 month, 1 week ago)

23 raw signals (0 security + 23 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 month, 1 week ago · v2 · last Δ -11.7 (diff) · 19 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 4 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
65.0
/100
Security checks
65
0 findings
System graph
65
77.8% cov · 19 findings
Critical
0
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 2 Medium 9 Low 7 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 19 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 1 Hardware 2 Security 3 Cicd 1 Quality 9 Api 3
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 65.0/100 with 77.8% coverage. It contains 211 nodes across 2 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 23 findings — concentrated in quality (13), security (3), api (3). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 2 high, 9 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 18 of 19 actionable findings. 23 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: POST /api/${slug}/intake (frontend/shared/wizard.js:93)
`frontend/shared/wizard.js:93` calls `POST /api/${slug}/intake` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/<p>/intake` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher skips it.
Dangling fetchFetch
high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: POST /api/client-intake/intake (forms/client_intake/frontend/app.js:285)
`forms/client_intake/frontend/app.js:285` calls `POST /api/client-intake/intake` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/client-intake/intake` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so t…
Dangling fetchFetch
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: CLAUDE.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
CLAUDE.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license, ci. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in forms/client_intake/frontend/app.js:104
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
forms/client_intake/frontend/app.js:104 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in forms/volunteer/frontend/app.js:180
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
forms/volunteer/frontend/app.js:180 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.
auth
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected
No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.
CI/CD securityCoverage
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected
Found 23 placeholder/mock markers across 6 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.
Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap
Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, ci. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: python:3.12-slim
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
Dockerfile:3 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Low test-to-source ratio
6 tests / 26 src (ratio 0.23).
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 5 occurrences Near-duplicate function bodies in 3 places
Functions with the same first-5-line body hash: core/espo.py:create, core/espo.py:create, core/espo.py:create This is *the* AI-coder failure mode (4× more duplication in vibe-coded repos — see https://jw.hn/ai-code-hygiene). Consolidate or document why they're separate.
5 occurrences
repo-level (5 hits)
duplicatesduplication
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: handler
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
core/app.py:41
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /
`core/app.py` declares `GET /` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
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