NovaSector/NovaSector

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136 of your 258 findings came from Repobility's proprietary detections. ✓ Repobility tags below mark them.

Upstream (GitHub) caused delay on this scan — not Repobility.

GitHub API rate-limited (HTTP 403) — preflight skipped, fell back to direct git clone.
Clone from GitHub took 320.0s for a 370.9 MB repo slow.
Repobility's analysis ran in 20.85s after the clone landed.

https://github.com/NovaSector/NovaSector · scanned 2026-06-06 00:30 UTC (4 days, 2 hours ago) · 10 languages

235 findings 11/13 scanners ran 27th percentile · Typescript · large (100-500K LoC)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

94 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 141 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

Score breakdown â 2026-05-18-v5

Component	Sub-score	Weight	Contribution
`structure_score`	60.0	0.15	9.00
`security_score`	100.0	0.25	25.00
`testing_score`	20.0	0.20	4.00
`documentation_score`	63.0	0.15	9.45
`practices_score`	100.0	0.15	15.00
`code_quality`	62.0	0.10	6.20
Overall		1.00	68.7

security_score may be inflated — optional security scanners were skipped on this fast scan

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: layer: software × excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 5 High 17 Medium 14 Low 18 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 94 System graph 0 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 48 Cicd 25 Security 13 Software 8

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

Showing 6 of 94 actionable findings. 235 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility 3 occurrences [MINED118] Dockerfile FROM `ubuntu:xenial` not pinned by digest: `FROM ubuntu:xenial` resolves the tag at build time. The registry CAN re-push a different image for the same tag, so every build is potentially different. Production images should pin to `image@sha256:...` for reproducibility + supply-chain integrity.

Replace with: `FROM ubuntu:xenial@sha256:<digest>`. Get the digest from `docker manifest inspect`. Re-pin via a scheduled bot (Renovate, Dependabot).

3 files, 3 locations

Dockerfile:2

tools/tts/tts-api/Dockerfile:2

tools/tts/tts/Dockerfile:2

high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `dreamluau.dll` committed in source repo: `dreamluau.dll` is a .dll binary (1,331,712 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1247 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.

Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.

dreamluau.dll:1

high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `libdreamluau.so` committed in source repo: `libdreamluau.so` is a .so binary (2,673,016 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1247 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.

Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.

libdreamluau.so:1

high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `rust_g.dll` committed in source repo: `rust_g.dll` is a .dll binary (9,733,120 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1247 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.

Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.

rust_g.dll:1

high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `tools/dmifonts/DmiFonts.exe` committed in source repo: `tools/dmifonts/DmiFonts.exe` is a .exe binary (27,648 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1247 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.

Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.

tools/dmifonts/DmiFonts.exe:1

low Security checks software Race condition conf 1.00 [SEC124] TOCTOU file access (os.access then open): Check-then-use file pattern (access/exists then open) lets an attacker swap the file between check and use (symlink attack). `mktemp` is deprecated for the same reason.

Use `os.open(path, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_WRONLY)` for atomic create-only. Use `tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile()` (not `mktemp`). For locking, use `fcntl.flock`.

tools/ss13_genchangelog.py:91

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