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tesserine/groundwork

https://github.com/tesserine/groundwork · scanned 2026-06-16 00:32 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

25 raw signals (0 security + 25 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 22 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 3 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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Combined
69.1
/100
Security checks
69
0 findings
System graph
69
55.6% cov · 22 findings
Critical
0
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 1 Medium 9 Low 10 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 22 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 3 Frontend 1 Security 3 Cicd 2 Quality 13
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 69.1/100 with 55.6% coverage. It contains 956 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 25 findings — concentrated in quality (13), cicd (5), software (3). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 1 high, 9 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 20 of 22 actionable findings. 25 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/contract/SKILL.md
Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.
skills/contract/SKILL.md:54 SecretsSkill file
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: skills/acquire/SKILL.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
skills/acquire/SKILL.md VerificationSkill file
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/release.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'subprocess_shell_true' in tooling/forge_operations.py:90
Found a known-risky pattern (subprocess_shell_true). Review and replace if possible.
tooling/forge_operations.py:90 Subprocess shell true
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — scripts/release_lib.py:317
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — tooling/corpus_resolution.py:115
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — tooling/forge_operations.py:88
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — tooling/install.py:161
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — tooling/mechanics.py:95
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.
auth
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 22 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 4 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/checkout@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
3 files, 4 locations
.github/workflows/conformance.yml:19, 22 (2 hits)
.github/workflows/release-metadata.yml:51
.github/workflows/release.yml:20
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Near-duplicate function bodies in 2 places
Functions with the same first-5-line body hash: tooling/install.py:install_skill, tooling/install.py:install This is *the* AI-coder failure mode (4× more duplication in vibe-coded repos — see https://jw.hn/ai-code-hygiene). Consolidate or document why they're separate.
duplicatesduplication
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Old/deprecated-named symbol `colliding_v2` in tests/test_reference_arc_topology.py:1240
Names with suffixes like `_old`, `_v1`, `_deprecated` usually indicate replaced-but-not-removed code (typical AI-coder leftover). Confirm and delete, or rename if it's the active version.
old markerDead code
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Old/deprecated-named symbol `test_state_lives_under_self_install_namespace_distinct_from_legacy` in tests/test_install.py:711
Names with suffixes like `_old`, `_v1`, `_deprecated` usually indicate replaced-but-not-removed code (typical AI-coder leftover). Confirm and delete, or rename if it's the active version.
old markerDead code
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: release_check_main
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
scripts/release_lib.py:429
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: release_cut_main
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
scripts/release_lib.py:448
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: repo_root_from_script
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
scripts/release_lib.py:46
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: tests/test_reference_arc_topology.py (1280 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
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